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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

# THE LEBANON

PART 11

January to December 1957

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING  
THE LEBANON—PART II

VL 1051/5G

No. 1

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF  
STATE AND THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER AT LUNCHEON  
ON JANUARY 14, 1957

*Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. Middleton (Beirut)*

(No. 10. Secret)  
Sir,

*Foreign Office,  
January 22, 1957.*

When I entertained the Lebanese Foreign Minister to luncheon on January 14 I asked him for his personal impressions following his recent visit to Egypt. Mr. Malek said that Nasser had seemed to him to be fit and self-confident, the only sign of a possible nervousness being his continuous smoking. His main anxiety at the time was the freeing of the \$40 million blocked by the United States Administration. So desperate was he for this that he was even contemplating confiscation of American assets in Egypt.

2. On the Canal, Nasser had given Mr. Malek the impression that he would not permit any ships, not only British and French, to pass until Israel had withdrawn to the armistice frontiers evacuating both the Gaza strip and the islands in the Gulf of Aqaba. In Nasser's mind the principal enemies of Egypt were Nuri Said, the late Prime Minister, and myself.

3. Mr. Malek had formed the impression that Nasser was not entirely his own master; he had to bow to the opinions of his immediate circle of advisers, perhaps twenty in number, many of whom were more violent and extreme than himself. To test him Mr. Malek had asked how he would view some guarantee against aggression by Israel, followed by proposals for disarmament. He had replied that, much as he personally would welcome the opportunity to divert the large sums of money now spent on arms to economic development, the Army would not permit it. If such a proposal could be dressed up as "arms limitation" coupled with a security guarantee, the Army might acquiesce, but he would have grave difficulty in persuading them.

4. A remark of mine that the long-term solution seemed to be the construction of larger tankers and of a pipeline through Turkey, led us to discuss Syria. Mr. Malek was horrified that we should thus tamely accept Syrian obstruction and said that he thought that we had made a grave mistake in concentrating on Egypt. If the problem of Syria had been tackled early enough, two years ago, it could easily have been settled. It was not intractable. There was only a tiny minority of Communists and it was ridiculous that one man, Sarraj, should thwart the wishes not only of Syria's immediate neighbours, but of the entire West. He felt confident that if we and the Americans could discuss the problem frankly we should be able to agree upon some solution. There were twenty or more Syrian politicians of standing now taking refuge in the Lebanon. They should be encouraged to believe that their cause was right. He did not regard any policy of this nature as subversive: it was rather a liberation and a restoration to the Syrian people of their natural rights.

5. I asked Mr. Malek what he would suggest that we should do, but he was unwilling to commit himself. He undertook, however, to speak in a similar and even stronger vein to Mr. Dulles and the President whom he hoped to see in the near future.

6. I then asked Mr. Malek what he thought we should do in Jordan. We were in the undignified position of continuing to pay the Jordanians a large subsidy while having to submit to public insult and demands for the termination of the Treaty. From our point of view also the Treaty had little value. Mr. Malek said

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that he saw no objection to our terminating the subsidy as and when we wished, but that such an action should be a part of an integrated policy for the whole Middle East. It should not be carried out in isolation and it should be so timed that when Jordan fell, she would fall the right way. In reply to my question, he did not think that the incorporation of Jordan into Syria would affect the stability of the latter: as he put it, anarchy added to anarchy produces dis-anarchy.

7. We then turned to the Arabian peninsula. Mr. Malek professed ignorance of internal conditions in Saudi Arabia, but he welcomed the signs of a rapprochement between King Faisal and King Saud. He thought that the forthcoming visits of the Crown Prince of Iraq and King Saud to America would contribute to this development. I told him that we took some credit for these events and hoped that the new friendship would blossom. The obstacle to better relations between Saudi Arabia and ourselves was Buraimi. Here it was not a question of a quarrel between Arab nationalism and British imperialism, but between a rich Arab king and two poorer Arab rulers. There was no question of oil—if that had been the only point at issue it could have been settled long ago. We were obliged to protect the interests of the Sultan of Muscat and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and if this protection meant that we were called upon to bring pressure upon them to forgo what they considered their just claims it would be a farce and our position in the Persian Gulf would be fatally undermined.

8. Our dispute with the Yemen was of somewhat the same nature. We had long had an agreement in principle for the demarcation of the frontier between Aden and the Yemen, but the Yemenis had never shown any desire to put it into practice. Instead they had consistently opposed by all means at their disposal the plans for the federation of the Arab States under our protection; plans which alone could provide the possibility of a higher standard of living for the people affected, but which would, for that very reason, undermine the Imam's own position.

9. Mr. Malek said that these questions were to be discussed by the Arab countries and he would bear what I had said in mind.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Ankara, Bagdad, Paris, Tehran, Tel Aviv and Washington, to the Head of the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations at New York and also to the High Commissioners for the United Kingdom at Karachi and New Delhi.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

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No. 2

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND  
THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER ON JANUARY 14, 1957

*Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. Middleton (Beirut)*

(No. 12. Secret)  
Sir,

*Foreign Office,  
January 23, 1957.*

In my despatch No. 10 of January 22, I reported my conversation of January 14 with the Lebanese Foreign Minister. Later on the same day the Prime Minister received M. Malek to luncheon. The Lebanese Ambassador and I were also present.

2. After the Prime Minister had welcomed him, M. Malek said that he had spent no less than seven hours with Colonel Nasser during his recent visit to Egypt of which four hours had been spent entirely alone with him. Nasser endeavours to give the impression that he is fully master of the situation, but the more one talked to him the more it seemed clear that he was far from sure of himself. In particular he showed himself very sensitive to the views of the Army. He pays little attention to ordinary public opinion which he considers he can turn on or off like a tap.

3. M. Malek said that Nasser's attitude to the passage of shipping through the Suez Canal was simple. For him an Israeli withdrawal to the Armistice Line was sacrosanct. He had repeatedly said "I want Gaza back" and had made it clear that until this was achieved he would prevent *all* shipping from using the Canal and not merely British and French shipping. Nor was he willing to compromise in any way on the payment of dues. He claimed that any system but that of direct payment to the Egyptian Canal Authority would be in contravention of the 1888 Convention.

4. The Prime Minister pointed out that the problem of the Canal was not only a political one. There would inevitably be a major financial problem in years to come. If the Canal wants to attract the really big tankers which were now being planned it would be necessary to spend large sums on its expansion. M. Malek indicated that this aspect was receiving little if any thought from Colonel Nasser. The Foreign Secretary said that one of the most urgent problems was to ensure freedom of shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba, and suggested that an effort should be made by the moderate body of opinion in the United Nations to propound a solution which would save everybody's face and at the same time guarantee freedom of navigation. M. Malek said that on this subject Nasser had one simple answer: aggression must not be rewarded. Until the Israelis were back where they were on October 25 he was not willing to consider any new proposals. Once the Israeli withdrawal was complete there would be a new climate in which it might be possible to discuss such a problem.

5. M. Malek expressed great anxiety about the situation in Syria which he regarded as the most immediate problem of the whole Middle East. Syria was at the moment in a state of anarchy and her economic situation was extremely bad. Attempts by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State to elicit any suggestions by M. Malek as to how the Syrian problem should be dealt with were, however, unsuccessful. On Jordan M. Malek agreed that Her Majesty's Government would have to bring the situation to a head, but took the view that this should not be done as an isolated act but as part of a general reappraisal of our Middle East position. In any case, Jordan's days as an independent State were in his view numbered.

6. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that M. Malek would put his views to the United States Government since it would be largely up to that Government to take remedial action in the Middle East. It was also necessary that the United Nations, which was in danger of becoming an organisation for the maintenance of the *status quo*, should adopt a more constructive and dynamic approach to Middle Eastern problems.

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7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Amman, Ankara, Bagdad, Tel Aviv, Paris, Tehran and Washington, to the Head of the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations at New York and to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom at Karachi.

I am, &amp;c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

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No. 3

## RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SYRO-LEBANESE RELATIONS

*Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received February 4)*

(No. 27. Confidential) *Beirut,*  
Sir, *January 31, 1957.*

In my telegram No. 145 of 29th January, I drew attention to one aspect of the bad state of relations between Syria and Lebanon. I have the honour in this despatch to resume their development over recent months.

2. Relationships between the two countries are seldom unclouded. Whereas Lebanon was once part of predominantly Muslim Syria it is now an independent semi-Christian State; and whereas Lebanon is essentially Westward-looking, Syria is very much preoccupied by its key position in the Arab Fertile Crescent. Constant economic jealousy arises because of Lebanon's position between Damascus and the sea, with its possession of the best port on this coast, as against Syria's ability to cut Lebanon off from the hinterland of the Middle East. In recent years also Syria has been in the van of the exponents of extreme Arab nationalism and has tended, by drawing Lebanese Muslims in particular after her, to embarrass Lebanon by accentuating the dangerous latent division between Muslim and Christian.

3. The main causes of dispute during the past year were:—

- (a) The Lebanon's refusal to accept Syrian troops on Lebanese soil in peacetime as part of an Arab defence organisation against Israel. The Christian Commander-in-Chief and the Christian President were the backbone of this resistance.
- (b) Economic differences: of which the main one was over the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipeline, but an important additional cause was Syria's persistent attempts to divert civil air traffic from Beirut to Damascus. Feeling over the pipeline issue was mainly directed against the I.P.C., but there was also a widespread impression here that Syria might have done much more to help Lebanon against the company.
- (c) Periodical accusations that the Syrian Government, and, in particular, the

Deuxième Bureau, was interfering in Lebanese internal affairs and disregarding Lebanese sovereignty by making arrests on Lebanese soil.

4. All these differences have in the last three months become acute. By virtually dismissing, in November 1956, the pro-Syrian and pro-Egyptian Prime Minister Abdullah Yafi and Minister of State, Saeb Salam, and opposing a moderate viewpoint to the extremist attitude of President Kuwatly at the Beirut Conference of Arab Rulers on the 13th-14th of November (particularly in refusing to break off relations with Britain and France), President Chamoun struck out firmly on a pro-Western tack. The Foreign Minister, Charles Malek, is now following this courageously abroad, and is being supported by the new Prime Minister, M. Sami Solh, and the President in spite of some outcry among the Muslims and Arab nationalists at home. In economic matters, the cutting of the pipeline has put in jeopardy the oil and petroleum supplies of both Lebanon and Syria. Arrangements have been made for the I.P.C.'s oil which was in storage in Syria to be brought to Lebanon (in Russian tankers) for refining and distribution to Syria, Lebanon and Jordan in the normal proportions. But this can only give temporary alleviation and there has been argument over the cost of the operation. Meanwhile, Lebanese oil and petrol prices have had to go up. When this oil is finished—as it will be in two months or so—both countries will again be in difficulties. The Lebanese are only too pleased to think that they at any rate have the Medreco refinery in the south to fall back on but must be nervous about the fact that its connecting pipeline passes through Syria and Jordan. In any case, the Tripoli refinery must presumably close down when stocks run out; and the much larger staff of the pipeline terminal is to be dismissed shortly, with dire results for employment in Tripoli.

5. Civil aviation has caused almost as much ill-feeling. The complete ban of transit flights over Syrian territory brought Beirut airport to a standstill in November

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and diverted its main customers to Istanbul. The restoration of permission for most countries (though only after bitter argument) has restored much of the traffic; but British Overseas Airways Corporation (Beirut's biggest customer) and Air France are still debarred, the latest refusal coming only last week. B.O.A.C., in view of their introduction of Britannias and the need for equipping their routes to receive them, are now unlikely to come back for some considerable time. A further example of economic pressure has been the recent Syrian ban on the export to Lebanon of mutton, and there is said to be some doubt whether substitute orders for meat from Iraq and Turkey, to take the place of the normal Syrian supplies, will be allowed to transit Syria.

6. Politically, too, the two countries are deeply divided. Lebanon is used to political ups-and-downs in Syria, but the "Conspiracy" trials now going on in Damascus are something new. In the Malki trials of over a year ago there was at least room for argument over the jurisdiction of the military court, and after long dispute only a single person was executed (though a number went into virtual exile for safety's sake). The present trials, however, seem to follow too closely for comfort the pattern of the classic Communist *coup d'état* and to offer no hope of justice or mercy; and many of those on trial are respected figures and the lifetime acquaintances and friends of responsible people in the Lebanon. From the Lebanese side there has been much criticism of the action of Abdullah Yafi when Prime Minister in delivering up Hayel Srour, a Syrian Deputy, to the Syrian authorities. From the Syrian side, the evidence given in the trials frequently—and to a Lebanese, by design—implicates Lebanon and the Lebanese as the home and abettors of the conspiracy. Moreover the Syrian press have recently been running a campaign of bitter criticism of Lebanon, most particularly because of the refusal to treat Syrian refugees here as criminals rather than political "évadés" and surrender them under the Extradition Treaty. One consequence is that the greater part of Syrian newspapers are now banned in Lebanon under the Emergency measures introduced on the 31st of October, 1956. It is therefore inevitable that those Lebanese newspapers who support the "Fertile Crescent Party" (Parti Populaire Syrien) should have been running for some weeks a counter-campaign of accusations of Com-

munist-Russian domination in Syria. They have played up a whole series of stories, some of which are likely to be made of whole cloth. For instance, Abdullah Yafi is to be sued in court for the surrender of Hayel Srour; a patrol of Lebanese gendarmes was arrested and treated with contumely by Syrian guards in the north-eastern frontier region; an attempt by Syrian Deuxième Bureau agents to kidnap the Syrian Deputy, Michel Elian, from the St. George's Hotel in Beirut the other day failed; a post office official in Syrian pay was detected opening the mail of the Syrian politicians who have taken refuge in Lebanon from the "justice" of Damascus; the Syrian Cabinet is considering demanding visas, at the cost of £L.25, for visits to Lebanon; imports through Syria to Jordan are to be diverted through Lattakia away from their normal route through Beirut; one of the gaolers of the accused in the Damascus trials has, in an access of conscience, written a letter recounting tales of torture—and also of plots to influence the Lebanese elections; three men found passing false Syrian currency in large amounts in Beirut were doing so under orders from the Syrian Deuxième Bureau; and no doubt other such stories will appear. It is not only the P.P.S. papers, however, who are reflecting this resentment. Among responsible people the fact of interference, the presence of numerous Syrian agents, Syrian encouragement of the Opposition here and undermining of President Chamoun's position, are all well known and resented.

7. It is encouraging that the strength of this resentment seems to be stronger than any feeling that the moral position of the Syrians, in following policies uncompromisingly anti-Western until "the last aggressor has left Egypt and Gaza," is basically right. There are plenty of Lebanese who agree about the duties of the "aggressors"; but their pockets are touched, their basic fears of Syria aroused, a widespread dislike of Communism brought to the surface; and the general attitude is that Syria is going altogether too far and along the wrong road. Apart from one or two extremists, even the Arab Nationalist press considers that the fault is at least as much on the Syrian side as on the Lebanese and calls for reconciliation. So far the Lebanese Government have shown no sign of knuckling under. They are said to have authorised imports of grain from overseas under Lebanon's International Wheat

Agreement quota to replace Syrian supplies; and to have sought supplies of meat from Turkey and Iraq; and strong words have been used with the Syrians over the various economic issues referred to above. It is important that the political courage of the present leaders in Lebanon in putting themselves at the head of the feeling against Syria should be encouraged and backed. Syria is in a position to put strong economic pressure on Lebanon, and if Lebanon is to

withstand it she will in the long run need assurance of support from elsewhere.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Amman, Ankara, Bagdad, Tehran and Washington, to the United Kingdom High Commissioner, Karachi, and to the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

G. H. MIDDLETON.

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No. 4

## LEBANON: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1956

*Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received February 11)*

(No. 32. Confidential)

Beirut,

Sir,

February 7, 1957.

I have the honour to submit herewith my annual report for 1956 on events in Lebanon. A calendar of events is attached.

**General**

2. The past year has been a testing one internally as well as in external relations. Against a background of bitter divisions in the Arab world, whose leader Egypt followed an increasingly ominous policy, Lebanon not only kept its head but ended the year with an enhanced reputation for common sense and the strongest claim in the Middle East to be a country of freedom and democracy despite certain obvious internal weaknesses. Cabinets continued to be as short-lived as in the past, constitutional, administrative, economic and social problems were left unsolved and Parliament, frequently lacking a quorum, showed no taste for serious work. These shortcomings did not have more serious repercussions simply because Lebanon is still enjoying an expanding economy and increasing prosperity.

**Internal**

3. The increasing ineffectiveness of the Kerame Government brought it to an inglorious end in the spring when it failed to reach an agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company on a new agreement fixing oil transit dues. The attempt to succeed where its predecessor had failed gave the main impulse to the successor Yafi Cabinet, which at the same time sought to align Lebanese foreign policy more openly with the Egyptian-Syrian axis. In the event, both sides of this policy collapsed simultaneously.

4. As regards the dispute with the I.P.C. Saeb Salam, Minister of State in charge of oil matters, chose to ignore entirely the validity of existing agreements and the various suggestions put forward by the company for adjusting their existing contract. Instead, he appealed to the people in the street on the emotional grounds that Lebanon, because it was small and weak, was being bullied by the oil barons of the

West and was suffering for its moderation in the past, while Syria had profited from using the big stick. The ultimate result was to fog the issue completely in the mind of the public and to drive the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies into weakly accepting, under popular outcry, an ill-considered law with retroactive effect withdrawing all tax concessions to foreign companies and substituting the imposition of income tax. Deadlock was reached at the end of September and the company announced that, in the absence of an agreement, their big new pipeline would terminate at Baniyas in Syria instead of Tripoli. Shortly thereafter the three pumping stations in Syria were sabotaged and, at the end of the year, the activities of the company had virtually come to a standstill except for the Tripoli refinery, which was in any case threatened with early closure owing to the exhaustion of its stocks of crude oil.

5. Another failure of the Yafi Government was over the problem of housing the many thousands of people rendered homeless by the severe earthquake of early March. In the latter part of the year some progress was made towards solving this problem but only after the responsible Minister, M. Emile Bustani, had left the Cabinet to devote himself wholly to the work. On other domestic fronts the question of reform of the electoral law continued to drag on without a decision, the urgent need for increased supplies of electricity was not met owing to a combination of governmental indecision and parliamentary obstructionism, important hydro-electric and irrigation schemes were left hanging as a result of petty internal rivalries and jealousies, and even the long-standing question of the expansion of the Port of Beirut and its future administration continued in uncertain abeyance. The question of the subsidy of private education threatened serious communal dissension between the Christian and Moslem elements of the population, resulted in a strike of Catholic private schools and ended in a weak compromise.

6. But these failures apart and underlying all the other domestic issues was the

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far graver problem of Moslem-Christian and East-West relationships. Yafi and his more powerful and sinister henchman, Saeb Salam, were strongly inclined towards a pro-Egyptian, pan-Arab and pan-Islamic policy. In Lebanon, where communal affairs are so delicately balanced, whose trade and prosperity depend upon free communications with the West and whose cultural and educational ties are largely European, this policy threatened to split the country into opposing camps. (In one instance the Lebanese Christian militant organisation, the Kataeb, dealt violently with their rivals in a minor but significant incident in a hill town involving a Communist-inspired insult to the Lebanese flag at the expense of that of Egypt.) In November after the intervention in Egypt the Yafi Government had moved to the point of wishing to break off relations with Britain and France. At this juncture President Chamoun moved with gratifying courage and decision.

7. His first act of intervention came in early October when the negotiations between the Government and the I.P.C. seemed to be approaching the point at which the Government would have to make a choice between retreat and sequestration of the I.P.C. installations. After efforts behind the scenes to restore the situation without giving undue offence to Saeb Salam had failed, the President was obliged to intervene publicly in order to prevent a general strike. Thereafter the conduct of oil negotiations was in effect in his own hands.

8. The second test of Chamoun's leadership began with the situation brought about by the events beginning with the invasion of Sinai by Israel on October 29. The Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt and Israel was secretly welcome to almost all Christians; but the reaction of Moslems was one of fury and fury was the keynote of all public expressions of opinion. The President promptly called for a meeting of heads of Arab States which, after one postponement due to the opposition of the Syrian Government, was held in Beirut on the 13th and 14th November. The moderate resolutions of the conference (which did not call for the automatic rupture of relations between Lebanon and Britain and France) strengthened the President's hand sufficiently to enable him to accept the resignation of the Cabinet and install in office a Ministry headed by M. Sami Solh. This move was almost

universally acclaimed, all the more so because the much respected Commander-in-Chief, General Chehab, took over the Department of Defence and M. Charles Malek the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the end of the year the Solh Government was firmly in the saddle and seemed likely to remain there until the elections due in mid-1957.

9. These developments illustrate the continuing and, indeed, increasing stability and resilience of Lebanon. The President, frequently accused of weakness, vacillation and other Levantine failings, has shown himself able to take strong action when such action was needed; Lebanon could not break off relations with France and Great Britain without endangering the place of Christianity in the country. The significance of the fall of the Yafi Cabinet lies in the fact that success for the pro-Egyptian section of the Moslem Arabs of Lebanon would have inevitably called in question the continuance of the Convention of 1943 under which effective power remains in the hands of the Christians. Once that position had been turned, it could probably never have been recovered. To the defence of their religion therefore was joined the need for the Christians to retain their political power; this gave the necessary strength to the President and his advisers. To the credit of most of the moderate Moslems it must be added that they did not seek to exploit the possibilities in the situation and rallied round the President to help him maintain Lebanon as it is.

**Foreign Affairs**

10. The duality which affects almost every aspect of the internal affairs of Lebanon was even more sharply marked in its external relations during 1956. Both Christian and Moslem Lebanese are Arabs and, as such, their emotions are strongly drawn by resurgent Arab nationalism. Responsible Moslems are aware of the economic importance of the West and the disadvantages of Arab extremism. The intelligent Christians do not want protection by the West from their Moslem Arab neighbours; they, too, are Arabs, resent colonialism (from which they have only recently emerged) and, for all their fears of Egypt, are mostly anti-Zionist and deeply shocked by attacks on other Arab peoples. The best elements in Lebanon are in sympathy with Western culture and philosophy, but Western policy sometimes appears to them as merely selfish and

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opportunistic and leading to the ruin of their small country as well as setting back the progress of the Arab world.

11. Against this background Lebanon instinctively remained on the fence during the events in Jordan at the beginning of the year which culminated in the dismissal of General Glubb. Over Suez the appraisal was a more agonising one and, as explained above, the eventual line of conduct was largely dictated by internal considerations and the paramount need to maintain Lebanese unity. Nevertheless, Syro-Egyptian extremism and fears of Communist penetration of those countries had, by the end of the year, brought about in some measure a reversal of anti-French and anti-British trends. The United States, the Mecca of so many Lebanese, achieved new heights of popularity due to its attitude at the United Nations during the Suez debates, though some doubts about the skill and experience of American diplomacy remained endemic. Suspicion of the Soviet Union was not less, but the visit of M. Shepilov, as well as of numerous Communist "cultural" delegations, have to some extent made the Russian bogey more familiar and therefore less fearsome.

12. On balance, the year brought if anything an increased sense of isolation in the Islamic world. Traditional friendship with France and Britain, though the political influence of the former continued to decline, was patched up for reasons of self-interest and self-preservation and the idea, or perhaps ideal, of a neutral status for Lebanon began to gain some ground.

#### Economic

13. Steady progress continued, but there was no outstanding development. The Litani Scheme is still in its very preliminary stages; and plans are being drawn up for a third basin in the Port of Beirut, whose trade continues steadily to increase. A number of bilateral agreements have been continued and new ones made. Trade on this basis has been particularly developed with Russia and the satellites, in an effort, so far fairly successful, to find markets for the increasing exportable surplus of agricultural produce. Events in the Canal area had unfortunate effects in the last two months of the year on the use of Beirut Airport by the international airlines, with consequential loss to the hotel and tourist industry. During this period, however, the Lebanese merchant community have been

fully determined to carry on business as usual, so far as they could, and were solidly behind the Sami Solh Government in its policy of retaining friendship with the West.

14. The United States Government continued to display a benevolent and practical interest in Lebanon's economic development, and, in addition to funds made available through Point IV, has granted a further loan of \$3,200,000 for road construction, and also \$470,000 for improvements to Beirut International Airport.

#### The Army

15. The small army played its part efficiently and unobtrusively as the ultimate guarantee of law and order in the country. Her Majesty's Government are in the process of supplying, either free or at greatly reduced prices, considerable quantities of war material and have earned the goodwill of the Lebanese authorities for the ready response to their appeals for help in this matter. There has been no change in the air force, which continues to be trained by the R.A.F. Mission. Her Majesty's Government are now examining the possibility of supplying a small coastal craft to add to the three patrol launches which at present constitute the Lebanese navy.

#### Conclusion

16. Anglo-Lebanese relations continued on a basis of genuine friendship in many places, and are greatly encouraged by the lead given by the President himself. Even in the trying weeks of the Suez attack he remained a steadfast friend whose grief at the action we took did not make him change his liking for our country.

I have, &c.

G. H. MIDDLETON.

#### Summary of Principal Events in Lebanon in 1956

##### January

- 4 Signature of Trade and Payments Agreement with Poland.
- 6 Signature of Trade and Payments Agreement with Roumania.
- 12 Visit of Mr. A. R. W. Low, Minister of State, Board of Trade.
- 21 Breakdown of talks between Lebanese Government and Iraq Petroleum Company (I.P.C.) on revision of oil transit dues.

##### February

- 2 Signature of Air Agreement with Norway.
- 20 Election of Bishop Zareh of Aleppo as new Armenian Catholicos of Cilicia.
- 22 Arrival of Russian Technical Mission in Beirut.

##### March

- 15 Fall of M. Kerame's Government.
- 16 Earthquake in South Lebanon: over 140 deaths.
- 19 Formation of new Government by M. Abdullah Yafi.
- 20 Yafi Government voted confidence by Chamber of Deputies.

##### April

- 11 Visit to Beirut of Indian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Sayed Mahmoud.
- 14 Exchange of instruments of ratification of Economic Agreement with France.
- April 24 to May 1 Unofficial discussions for new oil transit agreement between Lebanese authorities and Mr. Lawson, assistant to the general manager of I.P.C., unsuccessful.

##### May

- 1 Parliament approves statute on pay and conditions of teachers in private schools: teachers' strike averted.
- 5-15 Strike of Catholic private schools against inadequacy of State subsidy.
- 8 General strike of protest against French policy in Algeria.
- Announcement of offer by Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company (Tapline) of 50-50 division of oil transit profits, the share of the transit countries to be apportioned out by the countries themselves.
- 10-27 Czechoslovak Industrial Exhibition in Beirut.
- 12-15 Visit to Lebanon of official East German Mission.
- 21 Defence Co-ordination Agreement signed in Beirut between Lebanon and Jordan following visit by Jordanian Military Mission.
- 23 Lebanese Government notify Port Company of Beirut of their intention to exercise their right to purchase the company.

##### June

- 6 Yafi Government resigns. Revised Trade Agreement with Czechoslovakia signed.
- 8 New Yafi Government formed.
- 15-19 Admiral Sir Guy Grantham, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean, pays informal visit to Beirut in H.M.S. *Birmingham* accompanied by H.M.S.S. *Eagle* and *Surprise*.
- 14 Yafi Government accorded vote of confidence by Lebanese Chamber.
- 21 Trade Agreement with China ratified.
- 23 Grant by United States Government to Lebanon of \$3,200,000 for road construction and \$470,000 for airport improvements.
- 25-28 Formal visit of Russian Foreign Minister, M. Shepilov.
- 27 Signature of Trade Agreement with Egypt.
- 29 Lebanese Chamber passes law imposing income tax retrospectively on foreign companies operating in Lebanon.

##### July

- 6 M. Yafi, in a speech on his return from Cairo, urges all Arab countries to join the proposed federation between Egypt and Syria.
- 21-22 Visit to Beirut of Pandit Nehru.
- 22 Managing director of I.P.C. (Sir S. Gibson) calls on President Chamoun to discuss dispute on oil transit dues; without result.

##### July

- 25 Promulgation of Tax Law of June 29. United States Embassy presents Note to Lebanese Government disapproving Tax Law.
- 30 Lebanese Chamber passes resolution supporting Colonel Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal.

##### August

- 1-22 Meeting at Bhamdoun of experts from Arab countries who drafted proposals for an Arab economic union.
- 1 Ban on import of diesel-engined vehicles (other than those used for international traffic).
- 4 Entry into force of Trade Agreement with China.
- 5 Entry into force of Trade Agreement with Poland.
- 14 Opening of exhibition of Russian equipment in Beirut.
- Exchange of instruments of ratification of Trade and Payments Agreement with Roumania.
- 16 General strike in support of Colonel Nasser.
- 23-26 State Visit of His Majesty King Idris Senussi of Libya.
- 24-29 Strike and clashes at cement factory at Chekka in North Lebanon.
- 26 Visit of United States Trade Mission. Members of Christian militant organisation ("Kataeb") clash with pro-Egyptian Communist elements at Bikfaya.
- 29 Counter-demonstration in Beirut against "Kataeb" by (Muslim militant) "Najjade" organisation.

##### September

- Visit of International Bank Mission to discuss proposed modification to Litani hydro-electrical scheme.
- 6 Entrance porch to British-owned "Arab News Agency" dynamited.
- First meeting of Board of Governors of the English Secondary School for Boys in Lebanon.
- 11 Entry into force of Agreement for Commercial Exchanges and Economic Co-operation with Italy.
- 15 Trade Agreement with Bulgaria signed.
- 22 I.P.C. invite Lebanese Government to submit their dispute to arbitration.
- Lebanese Government ask British, French and United States Embassies to discontinue naval visits for the present.
- 25 Saeb Salam, Minister of State, states that arbitration with I.P.C. is not acceptable.
- 28 Final discussions between President Chamoun and I.P.C. (Mr. Herridge).

##### October

- 3 I.P.C. publish an apology and announce their decision to terminate the new 24-inch pipeline from Iraq at Banias (Syria) instead of Tripoli (Lebanon).
- 4 I.P.C. dismiss first batch of 126 employees from Tripoli terminal.
- 11 I.P.C. staff at Tripoli go on strike.
- 15 Initialling of protocol renewing for 1957 the Commercial Agreement with USSR.
- 16 I.P.C. strike ended by President Chamoun's intervention.
- Opening of Parliament and re-election of M. Adel Osseiran as Speaker.
- 18-25 State Visit of President Chamoun to Iran.

## October

- 28 General strike in protest against French seizure of Algeria rebel leaders.  
31 State of Emergency declared and internal security taken over by the military authorities.  
President Chamoun invites Arab Rulers to a conference in Beirut.

## November

- 2 President Chamoun calls a meeting of leading figures of all communities in the Lebanon to discuss the emergency.  
3 Report of Lebanese intention to denounce Trade and Economic Agreements with West Germany.  
8 Bomb explosion at Middle East Centre of Arabic Studies.  
9 Bomb explosions at Ras Beirut branch of the British Bank of the Middle East, and at St. George's (Anglo-American) Club, Beirut.  
10 British ship s.s. *Norman Prince* damaged by limpet mine in Beirut harbour.

## November

- 13-14 Conference of Arab Rulers in Beirut.  
16 Messrs. Yafi and Salam resign from Government.  
18 New Government formed under M. Sami Solh.  
20 Discovery of explosives and fuses in Egyptian Embassy car and staff premises.  
27 Lebanese Chamber accords vote of confidence to Solh Government by 38 votes to 2.

## December

- 6 Two United States destroyers visit Beirut. First Minister of Communist Poland presents credentials.  
14 Syrian Minister of Public Works visits Lebanon to discuss Syro-Lebanese differences over oil supplies and civil aviation.  
27 Serious outbreak of smallpox in slum quarters of Beirut: mass vaccination ordered on December 28.

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No. 5

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR ON THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1957

*Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. Middleton (Beirut)*

No. 38. Confidential)  
ir,

*Foreign Office,  
February 28, 1957.*

The Lebanese Ambassador called on me this afternoon to deliver a message from his Government. He said that the Lebanese Government and the Arab world had noted with approval the French and British respect for the requests of the United Nations General Assembly that their troops should withdraw from Egyptian territory but they were becoming increasingly exercised lest Israel, by her continued defiance, should in fact come off victor.

2. I said that Her Majesty's Government recognised this anxiety. They had always insisted that Israel must withdraw to the armistice lines. They did not think she was entitled to bargain over this or to demand guarantees in return for compliance, but it seemed to us that a solution of the question of right of passage through the Straits of Tiran and of the Gaza Strip would be to the benefit not only of Israel but of the whole area as introducing some elements of stability. Israel was certainly not entitled to more than international law allowed, but equally we could not agree that she was entitled to less. As for the Gaza Strip, I believed that secretly even Egypt would be quite glad to be rid of the responsibility.

3. As regards sanctions, I said that Her Majesty's Government viewed their invocation with grave misgiving. As a weapon, as we had cause to remember from before the war, they were not always effective and if the precedent were set of the General Assembly calling for sanctions against Israel there was no knowing when they might not be invoked again. Many countries were extremely vulnerable; Lebanon and the United Kingdom were perhaps the most vulnerable of all. We did not therefore like the weapon of sanctions.

4. The Ambassador reiterated the Arab view that Israel had profited at each stage by her breaches of United Nations resolutions. Speaking personally he recognised that Israel had come to stay but he thought that a solution could only be found on the basis of the 1947 resolutions. The fear of Israeli expansion prevented economic use of their resources by her neighbours, who were devoting too much to military preparations.

5. I said that we were firmly of the opinion that Israel should come to regard herself as a Middle East State and should learn to live in peace with her neighbours. We thought that a permanent settlement should be found on a basis of compromise. Israel should recognise the right of the refugees to return or should express her willingness to pay compensation if they did not wish to do so. Once compromise frontiers had been established we, in concert with the Americans and others, would be willing to guarantee them.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Bagdad, Paris, Tel Aviv, Washington and to the Head of the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations at New York.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

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SELWYN LLOYD.

VL 1015/8

No. 6

## THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION

*Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received March 5)*

(No. 45. Confidential)

Beirut.

Sir,

February 27, 1957.

In view of the General Election due to be held in Lebanon in June next, I have the honour to submit the following review of the present parliamentary situation.

2. Because of the division of seats between the different religious confessions there are no political parties in the Chamber of Deputies, although two or three parties exist in the country. Each of these, however, has only one or two representatives in the Chamber. These parties are:

- (1) The Christian Phalangists, who represent the militant Right wing of the Christian community in the country.
- (2) The *Bloc National*, who agree with the Phalange whenever it is necessary to present a united Christian front against the Muslims, but differ from it mainly because each claims to represent the Christians. There is no difference in policy between the two parties, which remain separate largely in order to satisfy the personal ambitions of the leading Christian politicians.
- (3) The Parti Socialiste Progressiste. This is led by the Druse leader, Kamal Jumblatt, and advocates a programme of social and economic reform and usually a foreign policy of neutralism between the East and West. Since the Suez crisis, however, the party has come down openly on the side of collaboration with the West.

3. There are two more parties which have been declared illegal. First the Parti Populaire Syrien, whose original platform was a policy of union between Syria and Iraq as the first step towards the creation of a Greater Syria to include Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan. In spite of being illegal, the party has one unofficial spokesman in the Chamber of Deputies. Secondly, the Communist Party which is not even unofficially represented in the Chamber but has increased of late the number of its sympathisers there. In a different category from all these parties is the Right-wing Armenian Tashnak Party which is well organised, strongly anti-Communist and represented in the Chamber by one Deputy.

4. The Chamber of Deputies at present consists of 44 members. A reform of the electoral law is now under consideration, which proposes to increase the number to 66 or 88. (The number of Deputies has to be a multiple of 11 in order to accommodate in their due proportions the various religious confessions.) While the need for an increase is generally accepted, a great deal of discussion is going on as to which of these totals should be adopted. It has long been felt that 44 Deputies were too few to allow either adequate representation in the Chamber of all the main interests in the country or a wide enough choice for the selection of Cabinets. Moreover, there is nothing sacrosanct in the present size of the Chamber since changes in the number of Deputies have been made at various times in the past, according to the desires of successive French High Commissioners and the early Governments of independent Lebanon. But how much larger the Chamber should be is a moot point which is being debated almost entirely on the basis of the personal interests involved and the likelihood of success in the elections for existing or would-be members. Elections in Lebanon are fairly free, but a certain amount of manipulation takes place and is expected. The larger the Chamber the less easy it will be to pack it unobtrusively and the less amenable it is likely to prove to dictation from on high; but too small a Chamber would prevent the ventilation of public grievances in a constitutional manner and would risk excluding from the Chamber leading figures, whose embittered opposition from outside might be more dangerous for the survival of the régime than anything they could do as members of the Chamber. This is the problem with which the President is now grappling.

5. There are two main issues in the election, which are closely inter-connected. Internally, the election will in effect be fought on the maintenance of M. Camille

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Chamoun as President. His term of office is due to expire in October 1958 and as the election of President is made by the Chamber of Deputies the new Chamber will be faced with this task at an early stage in its life. The President is accordingly anxious that the new Chamber should contain sufficient friends and supporters of his own to ensure his re-election or, failing this, at least to prevent the election of one of his worst enemies, such as Beshara el-Khoury, his predecessor in office, or Hamid Frangié. This conflict is reflected on the external plane by the President's support of a pro-Western policy against the wishes of his opponents who would like to bring Lebanon into the orbit of Egypt and Syria. There is a chance that the Opposition will be frustrated by the shaping of the number and area of the constituencies, at the manipulation of which the President is an acknowledged expert. The hostility between the two sides is so deep that if this happens several of the leading opponents of the President may well seek to sabotage the elections, for example, by organising a boycott of which there is already some talk. The indications of Presidential interference are already obvious. In order to allow himself more scope for patronage, the President has taken out of the hands of municipalities the power to appoint and remove senior officials and has reserved these powers to himself. Also, he has centralised control over the expenditure on roads, which hitherto has been divided up by areas—a system which allowed local dignitaries to have considerable influence on the way in which the money was spent.

6. An important factor will be how the Maronite Patriarch uses his influence. He has declared himself in favour of a Chamber of 88 and is in any case no friend of the President's. If the latter persists in too blatant rigging of the election arrangements the Patriarch may feel impelled to side more and more openly with the political opponents of the President. This would seriously diminish the chances of M. Camille Chamoun getting the sort of Chamber he wants and would almost certainly cost him his re-election as President. It is too early yet, however, to be certain that the Patriarch will carry his differences with the President as far as this.

7. There are no other internal or external factors of any importance in the election. If, therefore, we do not want Lebanon to slide away from its present friendly policy towards the West and more particularly to risk losing the President's own friendly attitude towards Great Britain, we must bring our weight to bear in support of the President and his followers and do what we can to frustrate the activities and influence of his opponents. I am corresponding separately with the Department on this matter.

8. Inevitably, the underground activities of some interested parties are likely to be as important in swaying the forthcoming election as the more open activities of others. The Russians, the Egyptians and the Syrians are all making their preparations. They will be greatly encouraged by the success which a handful of Leftists has secured in Syria; and we know that they dispose of much money. The West for its part can ill afford to see elections in another Middle Eastern country lead further to the Left.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Amman and Baghdad, and to the Political Representative, Middle East Forces.

I have, &amp;c.

G. H. MIDDLETON.

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No. 7

## COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE LEBANON

*Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received March 26)*

(No. 56 S. Confidential) *Beirut,*  
Sir, *March 18, 1957.*

I last reported on Communist activities in Lebanon in my despatch No. 173 S. of the 25th of October, 1956. To the public eye these seemed to diminish markedly for two or three months after the events of early November last, but they are now increasing again; below the surface they probably never slackened. In what follows I have the honour to analyse their course.

**General**

2. It remains true that in Lebanon most of the work of the Communists is done for them by others. The more Arab nationalism seeks to excite the Lebanon against the West, the less need is there for the Communists to attack us openly. Indeed, in recent months it would have been positively harmful to their cause to have done so too publicly, since there has been genuine and widespread fear in Lebanon of what has been going on in neighbouring countries and particularly in Syria. It is this, rather than events in Hungary, which has increased antipathy in Lebanon towards the creed of Communism. If therefore the Communists seem to have been hiding their heads this does not necessarily mean that their capacity for mischief or their intention to do mischief has seriously declined. If the *détente* which appears to have made itself felt in Syria in the last few days with the opening of the pipeline continues (and the Lebanese will be only too willing to believe in it), the Communists will rapidly begin to regain anything they have lost. If there is a major dispute between the Western Powers and Egypt over the Canal, Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba and Russia supports, as she no doubt will, the Arab viewpoint, the Communists' standing here will be improved.

3. The Communist effort to subvert the Lebanon can be divided roughly as follows:—

(a) The building up for the Communist countries of a reputation of friendliness towards the Arab countries;

(b) The support of all factions who sympathise with the so-called Arab liberation movement and therefore with these countries—Syria and Egypt notably—who support it.

The means used are (i) the Communist Party in the Lebanon; (ii) propaganda—by the written word and the demonstration of Communist culture; (iii) the development of personal relations; and (iv) the development of commercial ties.

4. Apart from purely opportunist lines, Communist policy is at present to attack the United States as the supreme imperialist. United States monopolies aim to exclude the East and everyone else from the Arab world; the United States supports the Bagdad Pact and, covertly for the moment, Israel; it supports France over Algeria; it opposes Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal; it was aware beforehand of the aggression on Egypt. The Communist countries offer only friendship, not dominance; they want not the Communisation but only the independence of the Arab countries. The true interests of Lebanon lie in close co-operation with the independent Arab countries—particularly "sister" Syria.

**The Communist Party of Lebanon**

5. As a tool of Communist policy, the Communist Party itself in Lebanon remains unimportant. All our information suggests that the cells here are half-hearted, and inactive, and are given little direction.

**Propaganda**

6. The propaganda machine on the other hand is fairly considerable. Its main agencies are the increasingly efficient Tass office in Beirut, the Information Office of the Soviet Embassy, and the cultural organisation VOKS. Four Lebanese newspapers—*Telegraph*, *Akhbar*, *Sharq* (dailies) and *Harach* (an Armenian weekly which may shortly become a daily)—are in fact mouthpieces of the Communists; and *Diar* (Arab nationalist) carries a lot of Communist material. *Akhbar* is believed to have a circulation of about 10,000 copies a

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day—which for Lebanon is very large. This is assisted by free distribution and probably by a sales organisation. *Harach's* progress is largely due to the intensive sales organisation of the Armenian Communists. There is a Communist printing house called "Najah" and a printing press in the Soviet Embassy. Much literature is sold through commercial channels which, by confining itself to artistic and cultural material, evades the current censorship; and the distributor is allowed to make a considerable profit, particularly on marginal sales. There is also a fair amount of covert distribution of material which does not pass the censor; and evidence of an organisation for wall-writing and the spreading of rumours as well as of pamphlets. The Soviet Embassy subsidises the translation of Soviet and Communist works into Arabic, and VOKS distributes a certain amount of material, most of it free, and runs a lending library. The Communists have no influence however in Beirut Radio and despite earlier efforts seem to have failed to make any impression in the film world.

7. The series of Communist cultural manifestations has begun again only recently. The Czech "Ballets Sluk" performed in Beirut on the 23rd and the 24th of February and the Russian "Ballets Moissiev" from the 6th to the 13th of March (an extension of their original programme). This show was under the auspices of the "Association for Cultural Relations between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and Lebanon." The latter troupe had been in Egypt for two months and the former was on its way to Damascus. A Chinese Press delegation followed an extensive tour of Syria by a visit to Lebanon in mid-February; a Bucharest football team in the same month played matches in Beirut before going on to Syria; and a Berlin-Leipzig team arrived from Cairo on the 24th of February.

**Personal Relations**

8. The development of personal relations among the middle classes has been more difficult for the Communists since last October. I said in my previous despatch that the representatives of the Communist countries had become respectable to know here. After the events of early November last they lost most of their respectability for the time being. It must be admitted however that social life in Beirut at the time almost came to a stop though not entirely. While I and the staff of the

embassy appeared with occasional embarrassment in such gatherings as there were, and began again as soon as possible our own programme of social entertainment, the Russians seemed to disappear altogether. We were unpopular but had a great many old friends. The Russian game on the other hand was suspect and the "rape" of Hungary passed by no means unnoticed. Indeed, due largely to the efforts of the ex-Polish Minister (of "Free Poland"), M. Zawadowski, there was a succession of religious services in prominent churches of every denomination attended by the leaders of Lebanese society for the victims of the Russian intervention in Hungary; and publicity was given, particularly through the efforts of the United States Information Service, to events in Hungary and to the repeated desertions of Hungarian sailors from Hungarian ships calling at Beirut. Such members of the Russian Embassy who did venture into society were liable to find themselves attacked even by those Lebanese who bitterly resented our own action in Egypt. By late January, however, the Russian Ambassador felt able to pay a public visit to Tripoli, where he was regaled by leading local citizens though there was no public demonstration of welcome. On the 24th of February the Prime Minister attended the reception given by the Russian military attaché to celebrate the 39th Anniversary of Soviet Army and Navy Day. By now it can be said that the Communists and, in particular, the Satellites are back in society. The new Polish Minister is a useful addition to their ranks.

**Commercial Relations**

9. In my previous despatch I pointed out that a framework of trade agreements with, and commercial representation from, the Communist countries had been built up. This has been further extended: a trade and payments agreement with Czechoslovakia and a "protocole annexe" to the commercial agreement of the 12th of July, 1952, were signed on the 11th of January, 1957; the revised trade and payments agreement with East Germany signed on the 12th of November, 1955, was ratified by the Lebanese Chamber on the 22nd of January; and, according to Press reports, trade talks with Roumania opened on the 14th of February. It is still too early to expect these developments to revolutionise the share of these countries in Lebanese

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trade, and full statistics for 1956 are not yet available. Already in 1956, however, statistics show that of the 48,000 tons of citrus fruit exported, 9,600 tons went to Czechoslovakia and the USSR, and that the USSR became an important buyer of Lebanese tobacco. The export of these agricultural crops is particularly important for the Lebanon. It is significant that almost the first public appearance of the Russian Ambassador since last November (referred to above) was in Tripoli, when he was entertained by ex-Premier Rashid Karamé and other North Lebanon notables largely to celebrate the shipment to the USSR of a trial consignment of 3,000 tons of Lebanese apples. Figures for December 1956-January 1957 reported in the Press recently gave the total agricultural exports to USSR as the useful figure of 5,718 tons. According to another report, East Germany has opened a credit of 1.2 million marks for the import of apples. Yet a further report says that representatives of China and the Satellite trade missions discussed with the Lebanese authorities in late January purchases of tobacco. We have as yet no figures of trade in other commodities, but the commercial advertising of Soviet *blot* agencies is extensive. It is concentrated particularly on the Satellite countries, the latest of which to be supported by a full campaign of publicity about its industry, agriculture, &c., is Czechoslovakia. Finally—though this is probably exceptional—Russian tankers discharged in Beirut port on the 7th of January and 24th of February a total of some 6,500 tons of diesel oil, apart from the crude oil ferried down by Russian tankers from Baniyas to Tripoli.

#### Political Activity

10. The direct influence of Communists in the political field is less easy to estimate. Among the various ambitious or disappointed politicians who form the Opposition to the present Government and President Chamoun and who are busy manoeuvring in preparation for the forthcoming elections more than one has been given Russian approval or said to expect Communist support. Notably, Hamid Frangié, who is a possible candidate next year for the Presidency, was recently praised in the Moscow Press; and Rashid Karamé, the leading Muslim politician of North Lebanon, is said to expect active Communist support. The Congress of Organisations and Parties which, as I have

reported previously, is a major rallying point of opposition and of extreme nationalism, and is permeated with Communists and fellow travellers, is playing a leading role in these manoeuvres, concentrating its attack on the President and on the maintenance of the present state of emergency which allows censorship to continue. The Armenian community continues to be a hot-bed of Communism, the Communists being helped by the continuance of the split between the Left-wing Hinshaks and the Right-wing Tashnaks. On the 26th of January an unauthorised meeting of 2,000 Hinshaks and Communists, at which four members of the Soviet Embassy were present, met in Beirut to express the same sort of sentiments as the Congress of Organisations and Parties. The Soviet Embassy has arranged for 200 Armenians to visit Soviet Armenia in May 1957, and there are many more applications. On the 29th of January the Left-wing members of the Lebanese Bar Association met in Beirut to form a pressure group inside the association (which itself, however, remains politically very sound); and a meeting of Lebanese Youth Unions was held in Beirut recently to attack the Eisenhower Plan and the state of emergency.

11. In the trade unions, the Communists have not made much progress since my last despatch, though they have continued their efforts. An attempt at a Lebanese Workers' Congress, which was encouraged by the Russian Ambassador at a cocktail party for trade unionists (boycotted by two of the main federations), failed at the end of last year. A certain number of telegrams were sent by trade union movements in Iron Curtain countries to the Lebanese unions at the time of the intervention in Egypt; but support for Egypt and for the activities of the Communist-inspired Arab federation (A.F.T.U.) during that period was less than might have been expected. The Lebanese unions have also, despite the discontent caused by the successive dismissals of workers from the I.P.C. installations in Tripoli in the last four months, not responded to pressure from the A.F.T.U. to entertain a party of Chinese trade unionists now visiting the Middle East. On the other hand it is possible that the labour situation in Tripoli presents greatest danger of Communist success at present: the unions failed to achieve the aims of their strike of the 11th-16th of October last following the first dismissals of workers from the Iraq

Petroleum Company. The more numerous dismissals at the beginning of last month were at first accepted in a reasonable spirit and blamed on Syrian action in cutting the I.P.C. pipeline. The company has however now made it plain that the reopening of the pipeline will not mean the re-engagement of these men. The Communist elements in the unions are almost certain to contrast this with the re-engagement of Syrian workers (under, of course, wholly different conditions) and to attack the more moderate elements and the Government for their inability to protect the interests of the worker.

#### Conclusion

12. The setback to Communist penetration of Lebanon as a result of events in Hungary and Syria has been more apparent than real. This is not to say that

Communist influence here is strong; the reality of the menace of Communism has been brought home to a great many thinking people who hitherto paid only lip-service to our own ideas on it. But in the hurly-burly of the forthcoming months both in the domestic field (the elections) and the international field (the Arab-West debate over Palestine) the Communists will find plenty of material to use against us, and they retain all the armoury they previously had.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Amman and Bagdad and to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

G. H. MIDDLETON.

VL 10325/4

No. 8

PRESIDENT CHAMOUN REPORTS ON HIS VISITS TO SAUDI ARABIA  
AND IRAQ

*Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 5)*

(No. 61. Confidential)  
Sir,

*Beirut.  
April 1, 1957.*

When I saw the President on the 28th of March, he gave me some background information on his recent trip to Saudi Arabia. He said that he had been impressed by the obvious sincerity of King Saud and by his firm intention to combat Communism. The talks had been frank and friendly and had been almost entirely private ones between the King and himself though the advisers to the two delegations were also available. As regards the joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit (a copy of which has been sent to Levant Department under cover of my Chancery letter No. 1018/14/57 of the 29th of March) the President suggested that the following were the most important points:

- (a) The statement of five basic principles should help to restore unity in the Arab world. More particularly it would put an end to the increasing isolation of Lebanon on which the opponents of the present Government had recently been concentrating their attack. It was true that the five principles made no mention of the Eisenhower Plan but at the same time it had been possible to avoid any reference to the Baghdad Pact, to "positive neutralism" and to Britain or France. President Chamoun thought that, even though this was a negative point, it was a useful one.
  - (b) As regards the objectives, the most difficult one had been No. 8, with its reference to Communism. The advisers had failed to agree the text of this paragraph during a three-hour discussion but he and King Saud were able to agree wording in less than 15 minutes' discussion. The President claimed that the recent joint communiqués between the United States and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, &c., had never mentioned Communism in so many words and that it was something of a personal success for him that he had been able to persuade King Saud to go so far. It was true that the reference was to "Communism" rather than to "international Communism", and this was due to the King's desire to avoid offending the Egyptians on this matter. Nevertheless, the point had been made and countries such as Syria would no doubt be quick to draw their own conclusions.
2. I told the President that some of the objectives listed in the communiqué seemed to me dangerous and bound to bring the Lebanon into conflict with France (e.g., No. 3) and Britain (e.g., Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7). Objective No. 5 struck me as being particularly unfortunate as it might imply that Lebanon supported Saudi Arabian claims against Kuwait. The President hastened to assure me that much of this was window-dressing, and that such claims as the Saudis might have referred to small areas near Buraimi but certainly not to Kuwait. As regards objective No. 4, he said that he was more than willing to offer his good offices, as he had already done in the past, if we thought that this might be useful in promoting a settlement with the Yemen.
3. The President then went on to say that King Saud for his part was anxious to resume good relations with Britain but that first there would have to be agreement over Buraimi. The King attached more importance to this than to any other single matter and, if we could give him satisfaction, King Saud would be more than ever inclined to draw away from Colonel Nasser.
4. As regards Egypt, the President said that the King and the more sober of his advisers were worried about the extent to which Colonel Nasser had committed himself to the Soviet bloc and, if only for that reason, would like to restore friendly relations with the West. As against this there were a considerable number of unfavourable factors:

- (a) Prince Faisal and certain of the advisers were strongly pro-Nasser and anti-West.

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- (b) The mass of the people were gradually awakening to political consciousness and were emotionally swayed by the appeal of Egyptian nationalism.
- (c) Egyptian instructors swarmed in the army and Egyptian teachers largely monopolised the schools. They were all engaged in anti-Western propaganda and the only people able to put up any kind of defence were the Americans, whose efforts hitherto seemed to be largely ineffectual.

The President concluded this part of the conversation by observing that it seemed more than ever important that Britain should once more be able to make her voice heard and that Buraimi was a relatively small price to pay for it.

5. On Iraq, the President said that King Saud was willing to have good relations with the Hashemites and he thought that he had detected a similar goodwill on the part of King Faisal. King Saud was even more or less reconciled to the Baghdad Pact, though he had mentioned that, since the Americans were already giving military aid to individual members of the pact, it seemed unnecessary at this juncture for them to join the Military Committee and politically unfortunate from the point of view of timing. But he did not seem to take the matter too dramatically. Those who seemed opposed to a Saudi-Iraqi reconciliation were Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Prince Abdul Illah and Nuri Said on the other hand. The President thought that the prospects were nevertheless fairly good and that anti-Communism should prove a useful common ground.

6. I understand that President Chamoun considers that, in order to bring King Saud closer to the Baghdad Pact countries and to detach him still further from Nasser, it might be useful if the President of Turkey were to pay a visit to Riyadh. He had broached the matter to King Saud, who was not particularly enthusiastic and said that the Turks had always been anti-Arab and pro-Israel. Nevertheless, King Saud would be pleased to receive the President of Turkey if he wished to come to Saudi Arabia, though he could not go so far as issuing a formal invitation with the risk of it being turned down. When I remarked that all this seemed a bit unpromising, President Chamoun said that he was nevertheless anxious to work on the project and was expecting the Turkish Ambassador immediately after my visit to see whether the matter could be carried further. (I shall try to find out what happened at that meeting.)

7. On Jordan, the President said that King Saud would certainly honour his part of the tripartite undertakings given to King Hussein and was anxious to maintain the independence of Jordan. Naturally King Saud was more concerned with seeing that Jordan was not absorbed by Iraq than with preventing a Syro-Jordanian union, but he realised that the latter might provoke some sharp reaction from Iraq and had concluded that the only thing was to support the present position of King Hussein.

8. On the Israel problem Chamoun said that King Saud was absolutely determined to keep the Gulf of Aqaba closed to Israeli shipping. His reasons were largely emotional, but he believed that if the Israelis were allowed to develop their overland traffic between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea they would succeed in time in replacing the Suez Canal as an international trade route to the detriment of the whole Arab world. Moreover the presence of Israeli warships in Aqaba waters was, in King Saud's view, a threat to the Holy Places of Islam and to the pilgrim route. This he would never tolerate and, if the Western countries were to help Israel in breaking the blockade, it might bring a sharp reaction from King Saud. The President added that King Saud had assured him that he had had undertakings in Washington that the Americans would *not* come to the help of Israel over the Aqaba question.

9. When I asked the President about King Saud's personal attitude towards Egypt and Syria he was inclined to take evasive action and I gathered that this difficult subject was probably not broached by mutual consent.

10. On his brief visit to Iraq the President said that he had been much impressed by the growing maturity of King Faisal but feared that both Prince Abdul Illah and Nuri Said were rather obstinate and inflexible, particularly as regards relations with Saudi Arabia. At the same time he hoped that King Saud's visit to Iraq would further the beginnings of a rapprochement which had already been made.

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11. When on the 29th of March, I called on Dr. Charles Malek, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who accompanied President Chamoun to Riyadh, he started by saying that he had never before visited the country and it had left certain very strong impressions upon him. The first was that the purely autocratic rule of King Saud was so full of contradictions (he cited the inconceivable extravagance of the Royal Family in contrast to the poverty of the people as a whole) that sooner rather than later there were bound to be social convulsions in the country. Literacy and education were slowly gaining ground and there were bound to be profound changes as time went on.

12. The second point he made was that geographically, politically and mentally Saudi Arabia was simply an extension of Egypt, from which country it was more or less accidentally divided by the Red Sea. The trouble in the case of Saudi Arabia was that it did not have the equivalent of Alexandria with its leaven of Mediterranean culture. Riyadh was much like Luxor or Aswan and the social and economic effects of a largely desert country dominated the whole picture.

13. His third point was that militarily and economically Saudi Arabia had become a protectorate of the United States. In these two spheres at least the country was not properly independent. In foreign policy it was of course at the heart of the Arab League and therefore inclined on a number of matters to be opposed to the United States. Nevertheless King Saud was personally more and more reluctant to follow the lead of Colonel Nasser and inclined so far as possible to align himself with America.

14. Dr. Charles Malek went on to say that, as was well known, there were profound divergencies within the ruling clique. The King was opposed by Prince Faisal and Yusuf Yassine, who were fanatically pro-Nasser and anti-Western. He thought the two latter were thoroughly evil influences and declared that much of Prince Faisal's antipathy to the West derived from his "most unfortunate experiences" in the United States. For the moment the King and his party were fairly well in control of the situation and the Americans were always in the background. But he repeated what the President had already told me about the extent of Egyptian infiltration in the army and the schools.

15. We then went through the joint communiqué. He said that the fourth principle was an important one and that, both privately and in committee, King Saud had given the most categorical assurances that Saudi money would no longer be used to support political parties and movements inside Lebanon. As regards the nine points of policy, Dr. Malek agreed that the Lebanon had accepted the inclusion of a number of points covering purely Saudi aspirations, notably points 4 and 5. However, he had been at pains in the drafting to ensure that the Lebanon was not accepting any legal commitments incompatible with Lebanese friendship for the West. The fourth principle was a general statement which in fact allowed to each country wide freedom of policy within the general framework of inter-Arab understanding. He tried, not very convincingly, to defend the fifth policy point; he admitted that the Saudis had pretensions not only in Buraimi but also in the Hadramaut and possibly in Oman but maintained that Lebanese support for such claims would only become operative after the Saudis had established the rightness of their legal case. I pointed out that, in my view, this rather legalistic line of defence would not cut much ice in Kuwait and other territories under British protection. The mere mention of possible claims would arouse suspicion and distrust. Dr. Malek then somewhat shifted his ground and said that, if certain concessions had had to be made to the Saudi viewpoint, they were not particularly important in the wider context, which was to continue the process of detaching King Saud from Colonel Nasser, bringing King Saud closer to the moderate views of Iraq and Lebanon and ending the virtual isolation of Lebanon in the Arab world, and thereby disarming the Moslem opposition to the present Government. He claimed that the joint communiqué had already proved successful as regards the last of these objectives, since it had brought about a more or less open split in the opposition to President Chamoun.

16. Dr. Malek declared that the talks with King Faisal and the Iraqis had been most useful. Coming from Riyadh, no one could fail to be struck by the immense difference between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The latter was largely Persian and Kurdish, with a totally different outlook on life and a far more developed social and economic system. He was greatly impressed both by the King and by

Nuri Said and the evident progress in the country. At the same time he felt that rivalry between Baghdad and Cairo could never really be eliminated. He hoped that King Saud's visit to Iraq would be fruitful and said that President Chamoun had impressed upon the Iraqis the importance of giving him the best possible reception. Dr. Malek thought that the President's very able pleading had had some effect.

17. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Ankara, Amman, Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Tehran and Washington and to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces at Nicosia, and the Political Resident at Bahrain.

I have, &c.

G. H. MIDDLETON.



VL 1022/13

No. 9

## LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY

*Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 16)*(No. 65. Confidential)  
Sir,*Beirut,  
April 11, 1957.*

As I reported in my telegram No. 389 of the 6th of April, Lebanon's foreign policy has been defined in detail in a long statement to the Lebanese Chamber by the Prime Minister. The Government has taken its stand, and the whole country will now be devoting itself to elections in which the Prime Minister's statement will be an important bone of contention. I have the honour to sketch briefly how the policy developed, and to give some analysis of recent foreign policy pronouncements.

2. The Prime Minister's statement is generally understood to have been written for him by the Foreign Minister, Dr. Charles Malik. The Prime Minister himself is not much of a hand at foreign policy, and his contribution to the battle of communiqués, following his recent visit to Tunisia (my Chancery's letter No. 1018/14/57 of the 29th of March to Levant Department), was couched in very general and inoffensive terms. The basic elements of the Prime Minister's statement could already be found in Dr. Malik's long declaration to the Press (summarised in my telegram No. 315 of the 16th of March) on his return from the United Nations General Assembly. In brief, his theme was that the Arabs are one nation but that it is possible to be a good Arab and still work with the West. For the Lebanon, even more than for other countries, co-operation with the West is essential. If, however, the Arab world does not seize its opportunity (and this point reappeared prominently in the Prime Minister's statement), this chance may be lost as United States opinion swings back against the Arabs and in favour of Israel. The touchstone of being a good Arab is to support to the hilt Arab rights for Palestine (not closely defined) and the sovereignty and independence of Arab countries (which includes "enslaved" Arab peoples). The Lebanon meets this test; but one must be practical, and the way to realise Arab aims is to draw on the vast resources of the West and on the fund of sympathy for the Arabs which exists there. To do this the Arabs must be prepared to talk with the West, and to show themselves ready to discuss matters objectively.

3. A month after this declaration the Lebanese Government took the decisive step of being the first to receive President Eisenhower's special envoy, Mr. Richards, to accept United States aid ("without strings") and to join the United States in denouncing international Communism (see my telegram No. 316 of the 18th of March). Very shortly afterwards (and after some misgivings about the welcome they would receive) President Chamoun and Dr. Malik went off to reinsure their policy with King Saud. The joint communiqué of the 26th of March (see my Chancery's letter No. 1018/14/57 of the 29th of March) contained a further declaration of opposition to Communism—not, out of deference to Saudi susceptibilities towards Egypt, "international" Communism—this time jointly with a sister Arab country which had not itself previously taken up this position in so formal a manner (the Saud-Eisenhower communiqué of the 8th of February makes no mention of Communism) though on the 18th of March King Saud had joined His Majesty The Shah of Persia in condemning "destructive ideologies" (Sir Roger Stevens' despatch No. 36 of the 23rd of March).

4. The Saudi-Lebanese statement also included what seems to be a new point of emphasis—the principle that States should not interfere in the internal affairs of one another. This principle was also stated in the Sudan-Iraq communiqué of the previous day (Sir Michael Wright's despatch No. 84 of the 29th of March); though not in the Sudan-Saudi communiqué of the 22nd of March (Baghdad telegram to you No. 25 Saving of the 27th of March). The Sudanese were evidently as keen on this as the Iraqis, according to Sir Michael Wright, though in general they seem to have been most things to most people during their subsequent visits. Mr. Abdullah El Khalil, for instance, having told the Lebanese Press that he did not know what "positive neutrality" was, subscribed in Jordan (according to the

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Press), in Syria (my Chancery's letter No. 1081/11/57 of the 4th of April) and in Egypt to that very "principle".

5. What did not appear in the Chamoun-Saud communiqué (and the President was very pleased about it) was any mention of this principle of "positive neutrality". "Positive neutrality", which was laid down as the main pillar of "liberated" Arab policy in the Four-Power communiqué issued in Cairo on the 27th of February (Amman telegram to you No. 373 of the 28th), appeared in that document to mean refusing to be drawn into the "cold war", rejecting foreign pacts, and letting Arabs rely upon Arabs for their own defence for fear of enslavement by their defenders. None of these points seems to have figured in any major Arab policy pronouncement since then except those which involved Egypt, Syria or Jordan; and none of them was mentioned in the Saud-Chamoun communiqué.

6. The last point of interest in these various communiqués is the new formula on the acceptance of foreign aid. The Sudan-Iraq communiqué of the 25th of March said it was good to "study" it in the light of each country's special circumstances and in the interests of its people, within the bounds of sovereignty and independence, and provided it did not harm other Arab countries. The Sudan-Lebanon communiqué of the 31st of March used the same formula. The Sudan-Egypt formula of the 5th of April, as reported in the Lebanese Press, puts it differently: Arab countries have the right to study aid *from any source* and to reject it if it does not fulfil the provisos in the earlier formula above.

7. The final form of Lebanese policy as laid down in the Lebanese Prime Minister's statement on the 4th of April adds therefore to Dr. Malik's earlier definition three important points, all of which have found some public support elsewhere in the Arab world. First, the Lebanon commits itself to opposing international Communism. Secondly, the Lebanon opposes interference by any State in the affairs of any other. Thirdly, it accepts aid from the West (on a basis of political equality). Also, as was emphasised in the statement, it interprets its agreement with Ambassador Richards as being a guarantee of its independence against aggression from any source and is offering a similar guarantee to any other Arab country that is prepared to accept it, on terms of complete equality and on the basis of the settlement of problems only by peaceful means through the United Nations.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Khartoum and Paris, the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces and the Head of the United Kingdom Delegation, New York.

I have, &amp;c.

G. H. MIDDLETON.

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VL 1015/17

No. 10

BACKGROUND TO THE LEBANESE ELECTIONS DUE TO BEGIN  
ON JUNE 9, 1957

*Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 14)*

(No. 81. Confidential)  
Sir,

*Beirut,  
May 9, 1957.*

The General Election in Lebanon is due to begin (as reported in my telegram No. 472 of the 7th of May) on Sunday the 9th of June and will continue on the three succeeding Sundays. The reason for holding the election in different areas on different dates is to avoid over-straining the forces of law and order and to make it possible to concentrate them in a single area of the country at a given time. The long-drawn-out nature of the consultation is not likely to have any marked effect on the composition of the resulting Chamber of Deputies because political parties—in our sense of the term—do not exist. Hence no question arises of victory or defeat in one place influencing, except in a very generalised way, later results elsewhere.

2. There are no political parties in Lebanon mainly because of the curious nature of the voting system. The country is divided into multi-member constituencies which elect candidates of particular religious beliefs according to an agreed pattern of distribution. Each elector has the right to vote for as many candidates as there are vacancies, provided his choices are of the right religious persuasion for the constituency. (For example, a voter in the second constituency of Beirut can vote for two Sunni Moslems, one Shia Moslem, one Armenian Catholic, one Armenian Orthodox and for religious minorities, *e.g.*, Protestants, Nestorians, &c.) These joint electorates are thus represented by members of the many different religions of the country, in proportions which are so arranged as to produce a Chamber consisting of 36 Christians and 30 non-Christians. Religion, however, which is strong enough in Lebanon to require this kind of division of the political spoils, is not strong enough to hold together, as voting groups in the Chamber, the adherents of each faith. The result is a Chamber of individualists where (subject again to an agreed conventional distribution of the loaves and fishes of office) every man is for himself and where the voting combinations change on each particular problem as it

arises. In these circumstances, the individuals who are returned to the Chamber are of very direct concern to the President, who has, by law and custom, great power in the formation of Cabinets and the policy of the Government.

3. There are no deep internal divisions in the country on which the electoral battle will be fought in the constituencies. The rapid evolution of events in the Middle East during the past year has made foreign affairs the chief interest. The broad division is between those who support the President and the pro-Western alignment of the Sami Solh Cabinet as against those who would like to see Lebanon more closely linked with the Cairo-Damascus axis. The chief proponents of this latter policy are M. Abdullah Yafi, the Prime Minister who resigned last November over the question of breaking relations with Great Britain and France, M. Saeb Salam, his Minister of State at the time, and M. Hamid Frangié, a distinguished Christian leader who for various reasons of personal ambition has linked his fate (for the present at any rate) with the essentially Moslem leaders of the anti-West school. President Chamoun is incurring criticism in his manoeuvring of the electoral field, now engaged in taking up its positions for the start of the campaign. He has many ways of influencing the groupings of candidates who will present themselves in the different constituencies and—more dubiously—of bringing pressure on electors. This grouping of names on a common list with which canvassing is done is an important element in the campaign: because of the religious and, in parts of the country, almost feudal nature of social divisions in Lebanon, large bodies of voters not only follow the candidate of their own religious persuasion, but tend to cast their votes *en masse* for the other candidates appearing on the same list. The President is causing concern to many of his friends by facilitating the candidatures and groupings of "yes-men": and by so doing alienating the sympathies and obstructing the ambitions of many active and well-qualified public personalities who have a legitimate desire to be elected. More than that, he

risks uniting by this course of action all those who disagree with him for either personal or political reasons. This might well have serious results for him personally: his term of office ends next year and he will, I am sure, wish to stand again. It is short-sighted on his part to think that he can achieve his re-election by the members of a weak and subservient Chamber of Deputies if many of the accepted leaders of opinion are against him, though they may have been excluded from the Chamber. More than this, however, his present tactics could in certain circumstances lead the country, by the violence of a reaction against him, into paths of closer collaboration with Syria and Egypt. I think this eventuality is unlikely because the basic factors of Lebanon's existence require her to keep closely in touch with the West: but it is a possibility.

4. I have, on several occasions, advised the President to act in a more statesmanlike manner and not to obstruct the return to the new Chamber of sufficient men of standing in the community to ensure that his régime will have widespread and solid support among the people. He is difficult to deflect, however, from his present line of policy. His years of office have given him an undue sense of confidence in his own capacity; he is intolerant of opposition and criticism and it is doubtful whether he realises the extent to which even certain Christians are lukewarm if not actually hostile towards his leadership. Though it is necessary to add that such opposition concerns the day-to-day tactics rather than the overall strategy of the President's policies.

5. If one strong influence on the course of the elections is the conduct of the President himself, another is the liberal outlay of money (and the propaganda it buys) by Syria, Egypt and Russia. It is known that the agents of these countries are spending very considerable sums on behalf of candidates whom they support. The Russian Embassy, for example, is reported to buy 1,500 copies of the Communist daily news-

paper for distribution throughout the mountain villages. One need not be unduly alarmed at this: Lebanon has always been a venal country and the acceptance of money does not by any means necessarily imply that value will be received by the payer. Nevertheless, if the President alienates those who should be his best political supporters while this kind of external pressure is simultaneously exerted against him and his policy, there is obviously a risk of the balance tipping beyond the point of return.

6. Developments in the Middle East during the next month, particularly the course of events in Jordan and the results of King Saud's visit to Bagdad, will have their effect on the course of the election. The evident gradual weakening of the Damascus-Cairo axis has contributed to the relaxation of tension in Lebanon during recent weeks. This situation has, of course, been materially helped by the strong security measures which have hitherto been applied. The "State of Emergency" has this week been lifted, but only—so far as political meetings are concerned—to the extent of allowing candidates to hold meetings in their own constituencies. No general mass rallies will be permitted.

7. On the whole I would expect a peaceful election with success for the President's supporters, and so a continuation of the same Government as we have at present or a similar one. The main danger is that the majority in the new Chamber will, individually and collectively, be of lesser calibre than the opposition minority and there will be left a sullen and resentful group of important political figures which will be a source of weakness to any future Government. This will automatically lessen the President's chances of being re-elected next year.

8. I am copying this despatch to Amman, Bagdad, POMEF and Washington.

I have, &c.

G. H. MIDDLETON.

VL 1015/34

No. 11

**POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE PRE-ELECTION DISTURBANCES OF  
MAY 30, 1957**

*Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received June 11)*

(No. 99. Confidential)  
Sir,

Beirut,  
June 5, 1957.

As the date, the 9th of June, approaches for voting in the first two areas of the Lebanese general election, tension and excitement in the country and especially in Beirut have mounted. After the deplorable exhibition of lawlessness on the 30th of May (reported in my telegram No. 573) conditions are now quiet; but the underlying tension persists and it would be optimistic to believe that the 9th of June can now pass without further incident. I have the honour in this despatch to fill out with more detail the account of events which I have already given by telegram; and to give some assessment of the present position.

2. As I have explained in an earlier despatch on this subject, there are no parties, in our sense of the word, in Lebanese politics. Political convention decrees that power in the State should be shared between leaders of different religions. The "Opposition" therefore is just another set of leaders, roughly of the same religious composition as the Cabinet itself. Their one desire is to turn out the Government, by fair means or—as is now evident—by foul and succeed them in positions of authority in the country. But not only thwarted personal ambition lies at the root of last week's troubles. The events of recent months in the Middle East have put the Lebanese elections in a wider context. The firm stand in favour of collaboration with the West, taken by the President in November last and steadily supported by his Cabinet ever since, has opened the door to intrigue by Egypt and Syria, all the more determined since the remaining client States of Abdul Nasser fell away from him last month.

3. It has become important to the pro-Egyptian element to change the régime in Lebanon if at all possible and there is evidence of much support from abroad, by men, money and weapons, of the Lebanese Opposition. (There has been separate correspondence with your Department about this.) Because of the confessional nature of Lebanese politics the Opposition could not be on purely Moslem lines; but it became for a time last week so dangerously tilted in that direction that Hamid Frangié, the Christian leader of the Opposition, was forced to issue a statement dissociating himself from any attacks on Lebanese foreign policy and insisting that the Opposition's differences with the Government concerned purely internal affairs and the arrangements for the carrying out of the elections. The events of last week were, in fact, an attempt at a *coup d'état* which, if it had succeeded, would have produced serious consequences for the future working together of the Christians and Moslems in this country.

4. It is true that provocation has been given to the Opposition by the too blatant manipulation, by the President and the authorities, of the electoral processes (beginning with the delimitation of constituencies and leading on the transfers of local officials and the gendarmerie), and also by physical interference with supporters of Opposition candidates, particularly in South Lebanon. By insisting on holding a mass demonstration, in defiance of the ban placed on it, the Opposition hoped to produce trouble in the streets which the Government would not be strong enough to deal with; this would have created disorder which in turn would have compelled the Government to resign. The "National Front", as the leaders of the Opposition call themselves, brought in bands of supporters from south Lebanon for the demonstration; they also recruited large numbers of Palestinian refugees and accepted the assistance of the Communists (who were warned through their party cells on the preceding evening to attend at 7 a.m.). Although it was claimed that the intention was to hold a peaceful demonstration, events and the preparations made by the participants proved otherwise. The demonstrators threw up barricades in the streets in a Moslem sector of Beirut and proceeded to stone the gendarmes who were on duty. In certain districts they opened fire on the gendarmes. They then proceeded to overturn and set fire to two or three private cars and a gendarmerie truck. The gendarmes had no choice but to answer in kind in the

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face of this provocation. Intermittent firing continued until 11 a.m., when the army was called in; for the rest of the day the situation, though tense, remained calm. Most of the shops in the Moslem quarters stayed shut that day and on the following two days, but the Christian part of the town carried on much as usual; such closing of businesses as recorded there was in response to intimidation by Moslem gangs and children. Total casualties were seven killed and some 70 wounded or hurt; of these, only one of the dead belonged to Beirut and only about 25 per cent. of the injured. The others had been brought in for the purpose of the demonstration.

5. On the 31st of May and the 1st of June various efforts were made to effect a compromise which would enable the Opposition leaders to save face and call off the general strike, which they threatened to enforce until their demand for a change of Government was satisfied. In these efforts General Chehab, Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese forces, played the leading role with the result that by Monday morning a satisfactory solution had been found. The General was able to act in this way not only because of the personal prestige which he enjoys in the country but also because he had for some weeks past kept in contact with the prominent leaders of the Opposition. He was thus able to use his special position to good effect when the crisis came. The compromise involved the appointment of two new Ministers to the Cabinet, Dr. Joseph Hitti and M. Mohammed Ali Beyhum, as Ministers without Portfolio who were charged, together with two existing members of the Cabinet (M. Magid Arslan and M. Mohammed Sabra) with the duty of overseeing the arrangements for and the conduct of the elections. This Cabinet subcommittee was empowered to receive and investigate complaints and required to make reports to the Cabinet on their findings. By a second decree issued at the same time, General Chehab has been given command of all the security forces, including the police.

6. There is no doubt at all that large quantities of money and arms have been supplied to the leaders of the Opposition and their supporters by the Egyptian and Syrian authorities. I have direct evidence of the arrival of a consignment of arms at the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut, delivered by a Syrian military vehicle. Although it is never possible to prove payment of money, the allegations are so widespread and the results so obvious that the inference can properly be drawn that in fact large sums have been paid. We know of one sum of half a million pounds (Syrian) distributed by the Egyptians to the Opposition and their supporters. And I am reliably informed that there is now little Lebanese currency left in Syria; the Lebanese money has been bought in for use in Lebanon.

7. It is clear that the events of the last week have brought about a number of changes in the political scene of Lebanon, some of the temporary and some of a more permanent nature. Of the ephemeral changes it is apparent that the Government has lost ground and the nature of the compromise settlement has been to the net advantage of the Opposition. Moreover the Prime Minister, Sami Solh, may well be a spent force in Lebanese politics. Probably because he is still convalescent from his recent severe illness, he was unable during these critical days to play the decisive role which he might have done in other times and it is doubtful whether he can hope to regain the initiative. At the same time I believe that the more extremist members of the Opposition, such as Saeb Salam, have become discredited and that, brought to the verge of civil war, the natural moderation and proclivity to compromise of the average Lebanese reasserted themselves. There was, too, some reaction against the more gross and obvious forms of foreign interference. It would be rash to attempt to forecast the results of the elections but I am inclined to believe that most middle-of-the-road candidates will be returned, whether on the Government or the Opposition lists, and the extremists of both sides will be found to have lost public support.

8. Of the more permanent features of the recent crisis the most obvious appears to me to be the exposure of the underlying contradiction of the Lebanese political system. The country is divided along communal lines, weighted in favour of the Christians (who return 36 out of 66 Deputies), and among the Christian section of the population the electoral weighting in turn favours the Maronites. At the same time, by the Convention established in 1943, the President of the Republic is by prescription a Maronite Christian, while the Prime Minister is a Sunni Moslem. In other words the electoral majority which the Christians enjoy in the Chamber of Deputies is accompanied by the frustrating restriction that they can never hope to have a Christian Prime Minister. This means that the President

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No. 11

POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE PRE-ELECTION DISTURBANCES OF  
MAY 30, 1957

Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received June 11)

(No. 99. Confidential)  
Sir,

Beirut,  
June 5, 1957.

As the date, the 9th of June, approaches for voting in the first two areas of the Lebanese general election, tension and excitement in the country and especially in Beirut have mounted. After the deplorable exhibition of lawlessness on the 30th of May (reported in my telegram No. 573) conditions are now quiet; but the underlying tension persists and it would be optimistic to believe that the 9th of June can now pass without further incident. I have the honour in this despatch to fill out with more detail the account of events which I have already given by telegram; and to give some assessment of the present position.

2. As I have explained in an earlier despatch on this subject, there are no parties, in our sense of the word, in Lebanese politics. Political convention decrees that power in the State should be shared between leaders of different religions. The "Opposition" therefore is just another set of leaders, roughly of the same religious composition as the Cabinet itself. Their one desire is to turn out the Government, by fair means or—as is now evident—by foul and succeed them in positions of authority in the country. But not only thwarted personal ambition lies at the root of last week's troubles. The events of recent months in the Middle East have put the Lebanese elections in a wider context. The firm stand in favour of collaboration with the West, taken by the President in November last and steadily supported by his Cabinet ever since, has opened the door to intrigue by Egypt and Syria, all the more determined since the remaining client States of Abdul Nasser fell away from him last month.

3. It has become important to the pro-Egyptian element to change the régime in Lebanon if at all possible and there is evidence of much support from abroad, by men, money and weapons, of the Lebanese Opposition. (There has been separate correspondence with your Department about this.) Because of the confessional nature of Lebanese politics the Opposition could not be on purely Moslem lines; but it became for a time last week so dangerously tilted in that direction that Hamid Frangié, the Christian leader of the Opposition, was forced to issue a statement dissociating himself from any attacks on Lebanese foreign policy and insisting that the Opposition's differences with the Government concerned purely internal affairs and the arrangements for the carrying out of the elections. The events of last week were, in fact, an attempt at a *coup d'état* which, if it had succeeded, would have produced serious consequences for the future working together of the Christians and Moslems in this country.

4. It is true that provocation has been given to the Opposition by the too blatant manipulation, by the President and the authorities, of the electoral processes (beginning with the delimitation of constituencies and leading on the transfers of local officials and the gendarmerie), and also by physical interference with supporters of Opposition candidates, particularly in South Lebanon. By insisting on holding a mass demonstration, in defiance of the ban placed on it, the Opposition hoped to produce trouble in the streets which the Government would not be strong enough to deal with; this would have created disorder which in turn would have compelled the Government to resign. The "National Front", as the leaders of the Opposition call themselves, brought in bands of supporters from south Lebanon for the demonstration; they also recruited large numbers of Palestinian refugees and accepted the assistance of the Communists (who were warned through their party cells on the preceding evening to attend at 7 a.m.). Although it was claimed that the intention was to hold a peaceful demonstration, events and the preparations made by the participants proved otherwise. The demonstrators threw up barricades in the streets in a Moslem sector of Beirut and proceeded to stone the gendarmes who were on duty. In certain districts they opened fire on the gendarmes. They then proceeded to overturn and set fire to two or three private cars and a gendarmerie truck. The gendarmes had no choice but to answer in kind in the

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face of this provocation. Intermittent firing continued until 11 a.m., when the army was called in; for the rest of the day the situation, though tense, remained calm. Most of the shops in the Moslem quarters stayed shut that day and on the following two days, but the Christian part of the town carried on much as usual; such closing of businesses as recorded there was in response to intimidation by Moslem gangs and children. Total casualties were seven killed and some 70 wounded or hurt; of these, only one of the dead belonged to Beirut and only about 25 per cent. of the injured. The others had been brought in for the purpose of the demonstration.

5. On the 31st of May and the 1st of June various efforts were made to effect a compromise which would enable the Opposition leaders to save face and call off the general strike, which they threatened to enforce until their demand for a change of Government was satisfied. In these efforts General Chehab, Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese forces, played the leading role with the result that by Monday morning a satisfactory solution had been found. The General was able to act in this way not only because of the personal prestige which he enjoys in the country but also because he had for some weeks past kept in contact with the prominent leaders of the Opposition. He was thus able to use his special position to good effect when the crisis came. The compromise involved the appointment of two new Ministers to the Cabinet, Dr. Joseph Hitti and M. Mohammed Ali Beyhum, as Ministers without Portfolio who were charged, together with two existing members of the Cabinet (M. Magid Arslan and M. Mohammed Sabra) with the duty of overseeing the arrangements for and the conduct of the elections. This Cabinet subcommittee was empowered to receive and investigate complaints and required to make reports to the Cabinet on their findings. By a second decree issued at the same time, General Chehab has been given command of all the security forces, including the police.

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8. Of the more permanent features of the recent crisis the most obvious appears to me to be the exposure of the underlying contradiction of the Lebanese political system. The country is divided along communal lines, weighted in favour of the Christians (who return 36 out of 66 Deputies), and among the Christian section of the population the electoral weighting in turn favours the Maronites. At the same time, by the Convention established in 1943, the President of the Republic is by prescription a Maronite Christian, while the Prime Minister is a Sunni Moslem. In other words the electoral majority which the Christians enjoy in the Chamber of Deputies is accompanied by the frustrating restriction that they can never hope to have a Christian Prime Minister. This means that the President

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of the Republic, as the representative of the most important section of the Christian majority, must inevitably be brought into day-to-day politics to redress the balance. There has been a good deal of specious talk by the Opposition about the "un-neutral" role played by the President during the crisis of the last few days. But, as I have explained, no President who expects to enjoy the support of the country can fail to play an active part in internal politics and the consequent confusion between the chief executive and the chief legislative powers in Lebanon is a source of weakness as regards future stability.

9. A second feature to which I would draw attention is the intervention of the army, which last occurred in 1952, not only to restore order but also to assume virtual political control of the country in a moment of crisis. General Chehab has been much praised publicly as the impartial guarantor of political freedom but the fact is that the Lebanese Army is a largely static body which can never expect to have a properly military function and whose duties are largely confined to the maintenance of internal order, in which promotion is almost non-existent and where dissatisfaction among the younger officers must exist. There have been the examples in neighbouring countries of the preponderant part which the army has been able to assume during times of political evolution, if not revolution. Hitherto the Lebanese Army has fortunately remained largely divorced from day-to-day politics. But I seriously doubt whether this will remain the case in future and there is the real danger that, unless political institutions can be reinvigorated, military cliques may be tempted to take over where politicians have failed.

10. Finally, I was unfavourably struck by the general flabbiness of the wealthy merchants and business men when faced with a situation which seemed to threaten their easy way of life. Lebanon, by its nature, is a living compromise and moderate Moslems and Christians alike believe that the prosperity and well-being of the country can only be assured under a liberal régime which can tolerate with indulgence a wide variety of sectarian and political differences. Fanaticism has always been alien to the Lebanese character. But even the most generous liberalism demands at least a minimum of moral conviction and a certain willingness to defend a given way of life. Once tolerance and total surrender become confused the very national existence of the country is in danger. French colleagues of mine were reminded during this past week of what happened in France in 1939 and 1940: the middle and upper classes too self-indulgent to defend uncomfortable political principles and the consequent collapse in the face of the enemy. Whatever the outcome of the coming elections the future Governments of Lebanon will be faced with a hard task of re-instilling some sense of vigour and purpose into the evidently decadent body politic.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Baghdad, Bahrain and Ankara and to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

G. H. MIDDLETON.

## THE RESULTS OF THE LEBANESE ELECTIONS

*Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 9)*

(No. 117. Confidential)

*Beirut,*

Sir,

*July 4, 1957.*

I have reported by despatch on the situation in Lebanon before the recent elections began and by weekly telegram (the last being my telegram No. 711 of the 1st of July) the results of the voting on each of the four Sundays on which the elections took place. I now have the honour to submit some general conclusions on the conduct and course of these elections. The outstanding characteristics have been four: the intensity of political passion which was generated during the period since November 1956, the bribery and intimidation of electors which took place, the interference from outside Lebanon, and the fact that Lebanon's foreign policy was put forward as the dominating issue although the real conflict of the elections lay in the personal and sometimes sordid ambitions of the various leaders.

2. The election campaign really began last year over the revision of the law governing the constitution of the Chamber of Deputies. Should Lebanon continue to have a Chamber of 44 members or should the number be increased—and, if so, by how many multiples of eleven? The argument finally crystallised round the merits of 88 or 66 members: the larger Chamber would have accommodated not only all the leading representatives of the various religious denominations of the country, in their due proportions, but would have provided sufficient room for manoeuvre in forming Ministries to avoid constant recourse to the same small band of "possibles". Against this, the lesson of what one Communist in the Syrian Chamber has been able to do made the President and others very chary of opening the door sufficiently wide to risk such an unwelcome addition to the Lebanese Chamber. Also, and much more relevant to this year's elections, the President wished to create a Chamber which would not be too large for him to manipulate. Traditionally the President's wishes carry great weight with the Deputies; and since the new Chamber will be the one which elects the next President in 1958, M. Chamoun had obvious interest in its composition. If

indeed he intends to stand for a second term, he will need first to coax the new Chamber into amending the law to permit him to do so. That, however, does not suit the book of his critics and would-be successors who led the campaign against a smaller and more malleable Chamber. It was for this basic reason that the Government and opposition fronts gradually coalesced round the partisans of a Chamber of 66 or 88 members; and it was this which caused the degree of personal bitterness in these elections.

3. Elections in Lebanon have never been wholly free. This is a small country and the party in power has many means of persuasion at its disposal. This time, however, these were used as seldom before. The actual means range from the positioning of key local Government or security officials in particular villages or areas where anti-government candidates have a strong following to actual intimidation on polling day of voters hostile to the Government, to an extent which prevents them from casting their votes. It is not necessary for physical intimidation to be used. The way to the polling booth can be obstructed, the returning officers (helped by the system which lists voters by their first names) can fail for hours to find in the register the names of would-be voters until in disgust they return home; or the registers can be falsified beforehand so that names are in fact not in them. One defeated candidate, for example, whose word I believe, has told us that his constituents have brought him over 1,000 voting papers which they could not deposit because they were told that their names were not on the electoral roll. Intimidation is not an empty threat: one unfortunate voter who dared to go against the official candidate in one mountain constituency had his coca-cola shop smashed up the next day by the local gendarmes. In Lebanon it has always been more or less like this; but it is generally alleged that interference by Government agencies of one kind or another went further this time than ever before. General Chehab, the Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese Defence Forces, summed up this aspect of the elections in a conversation with me a

few days ago by stating that the "corruption, bribery and general skulduggery during the recent elections had been a scandal by any standard and had reached proportions never before seen in the Lebanon". The General's memory perhaps fails him; from the stories I hear, these things have happened before.

4. As for bribery and corruption, candidates and votes were more or less openly bought and sold in the market place. In one case there is a fairly well authenticated story that the only serious rival was persuaded to withdraw for a consideration of £Leb.600,000 and the promise of an Embassy abroad. In the Zahlé constituency the two leading contenders, cousins as it happened, are said to have spent £Leb.3 million between them buying votes and to have ruined themselves in the process. A very wealthy Druze unsuccessfully invested £Leb.1½ million for a seat. With corruption on such a scale, Egyptian, Syrian and perhaps Russian money (as opposed to propaganda and covert influence) may in the event have had no more than a marginal influence.

5. With such a setting for the elections and against the background of Middle East affairs of last year it was to be expected that outside influences would use all possible means of pressure open to them. It will be recalled that Abdallah Yafi and Saeb Salam had gone out of power at the time of the Suez crisis on the issue of breaking off relations with the United Kingdom and France. President Chamoun had been largely instrumental in defeating their designs and the possibility of his re-election in 1958 was one of the scarcely hidden issues of the electoral battle. It was obvious therefore that Egypt and its supporters would do all they could to help the Opposition front in these elections. If Yafi could return as Prime Minister and if a Ministry favourable to Nasser and all he stands for at present could be formed in the Lebanon, a great victory would have been won and the trend towards the gradual restoration of our own position would have been reversed. Egyptian money, influence and especially propaganda were freely employed, supported of course by the Syrians and Communists. Their newspapers and wireless broadcasts were tireless in venomous attack on President Chamoun, Prime Minister Sami Solh and Foreign Minister Charles Malek. Fortunately from this point of view—as from others—King Saud's change of front in the last few months introduced a jarring note

into the chorus of criticism of the West; and as he had been the great paymaster (for other purposes) in the past couple of years, his change of policy produced confusion in the ranks of the Opposition. The Iraqis played some part, as did the Americans and ourselves and to a much smaller extent the French, in combating Egyptian and Syrian influence in the elections. Syrian interference was open: one of the Opposition's successful candidates, whose constituency lies on the Syrian border, has told a member of my staff that he and the others on his list received an offer of help from the Syrians who volunteered to kidnap anyone they liked to name. Charles Malek has also told me that six Syrian agents were arrested in his constituency.

6. The issue of foreign policy introduced a particular virulence and, for Lebanon, an uncharacteristic conflict into this electoral campaign. The Government of Sami Solh and the Presidency of M. Chamoun stood as symbols of pro-Western and anti-Nasser policy. The more fanatical pan-Arabists took up the challenge eagerly and fiercely. Lebanon's espousal of the Eisenhower doctrine was represented as a betrayal of the best interests of the Arab and, by an easy extension, of the Moslem world. Despite the pleas of the moderates, the division of political opinion quickly came to have a confessional character. The battle was between "Government" and "Opposition"; Moslems who supported the former or Christians who inclined toward the latter were liable to be branded as traitors to their faith. The normally restrained jockeying for position between candidates of the same denomination, which is part of the compromise established by convention, was transformed into a more bitter and more dangerous conflict. It still remains to be seen whether the present Lebanese electoral system will survive unchanged the strains to which it has been subjected during the past months.

7. From our point of view the final result of the elections is satisfactory though no one has emerged with enhanced reputation. Over two-thirds of the Chamber are supporters of the President while at the same time various leading members of the Opposition have been elected. This has made the position of the extra-Parliamentary opposition (including Abdallah Yafi and Saeb Salam) uncertain; they are puzzled to know what to do next. They are debarred by their partial success from reviving their more extremist demands,

which they were making after the election results of the first week were known (when Abdallah Yafi, Saeb Salam and Ahmed al-Assaad were defeated). These included the proposal that the new Chamber of Deputies should be totally boycotted and the elections declared null and void. There will now however be a highly vocal opposition within the Chamber which, while it may refrain from raising the foreign policy issue, will concentrate its attacks on the Government and the person of the President, the latter being the main target. The object of the attacks against the President will be to frustrate any attempt by him to change the constitution so as to enable him to stand for a second term of office.

8. When the new Chamber meets, probably in mid-August, a new Government will be formed. It remains to be seen whether the President will call on M. Sami

Solh again to form a Government and carry on a few months longer. The Prime Minister, however, gives the impression of being exhausted by the election month which followed so closely on his serious illness in May; and I am doubtful whether he will be able or willing to continue in office for long. It is to be hoped that his eventual successor, whoever he may be, will show sufficient political sagacity to reconcile the naturally pro-Western proclivities and interests of the majority of Lebanese with the Moslem-Arab susceptibilities of an important minority.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman and Bagdad, and to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

G. H. MIDDLETON.

VL 1015/53

No. 13

THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON AND PRESIDENT  
CHAMOUN'S POSITION

Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received October 7)

(No. 156. Confidential) Beirut,  
Sir, October 1, 1957.

The internal situation in Lebanon has continued to be among the major pre-occupations of the President and his Government; and events in Syria, as suggested in Mr. Scott's despatch No. 140 of August 22, are proving a determining factor in Lebanese domestic politics.

2. Although there is some popular sympathy in Lebanon for the present Syrian régime it is neither so widespread nor so vociferous as to threaten internal stability in this country. If the Opposition leaders have at times been (and continue to be) over-enthusiastic in their pro-Syrian sentiments, this has so far had the effect of rallying the loyalist forces in support of the Government. But the real handicap of the latter is that both sides and all classes here realise that in the long run close and even "brotherly" relations with Syria are an economic as well as a political necessity. The persistent hostility of official Syria towards the present Lebanese régime has therefore served to encourage the Opposition in this country who have received material support (in the form of arms, explosives and money) as well as moral backing from Damascus. At the same time, the success and impunity with which Syria is pursuing her present profitable course of friendship with Russia and "positive neutrality" are to some extent weakening those elements in the Lebanon who are most loyal to the President. While the tide of Arab nationalism is running strongly and Communism still seems remote, they must doubt, for example, whether they are really backing the right horse and whether it is worth while continuing to support the President during his last year of office.

3. For the next six months the main determining factor in the internal situation is whether the President is going to stand for re-election in September 1958. If he does so decide it will mean that he feels strong enough to manipulate a change in the law, which as it stands does not allow re-election, and also confident of a majority of votes in the Chamber of Deputies to get himself

thereafter elected. I do not expect him to make his decision until the last possible moment. If he decides not to stand, he will from that moment onwards risk losing the support of all the Deputies who now back him, as they will be reinsuring their future with the person they think likely to win the succession. If, on the other hand, he does decide to stand again, there is, on present indications, certain to be a strong reaction outside the Chamber of Deputies. This will be led by members of the present Opposition and undoubtedly encouraged by Syrian and Egyptian agents in the country. The third possibility is that President Chamoun should be succeeded by a candidate of his own choice but for the moment this solution seems very improbable.

4. A disquieting feature of the present internal situation is the sharp decline that has taken place in the general authority of Government. Much of this is due to deliberate interference from Syria. A recent and notable example was the recent refusal of the Syrian authorities to allow a Lebanese army detachment which was trying to round up a gun-running gang to use the only motorable approach road (built, incidentally, by the Lebanese) to the village of Deir el Achayer because it crossed a kilometre or two of territory claimed to be Syrian. As a result the gang is still presumably at large. Similarly there is the widespread and, in my opinion, well-founded belief that the continuing explosions against pro-Government (or at least anti-Communist) newspapers and organisations, such as political clubs, is the work of the Syrian *deuxième bureau*. At all events the relative helplessness of the security forces in the face of these deliberate attacks on law and order has created a general unease which quickly becomes a lack of confidence in the energy and efficacy of the Government. The latter have unfortunately contributed to this feeling by the weakness or ineptitude with which they have handled their opponents. Thus the Court of Enquiry into the serious events in Beirut of May 30 last has found that some 400 persons are incriminated including the leaders of the

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Opposition, notably Abdallah Yafi and Saeb Salam, both former Prime Ministers. In the normal course of events such a finding would lead to legal action. But already there are indications that "arrangements" will be made and the case dropped or the accused amnestied. Similarly the differences between the President and Kamal Jumblatt, the Druze leader who failed to win a seat in the last elections and for a time threatened more or less open rebellion, are in the process of being composed. Authority, in fact, has simply become an instrument of political jobbery. In the circumstances the excesses of the Opposition or of the Syrian *deuxième bureau* do not attract the public condemnation which might otherwise be expected.

5. So much turns on personalities and personal relations that it is impossible at this stage to make an objective assessment of the President's prospects for re-election. He is increasingly the target for criticism on various counts, including his bad choice of collaborators and the favouritism and corruption of the régime, which is increasingly evident. Public works projects, cheap housing, the social services have all lagged or been neglected. The President's claim therefore that he is being attacked on the internal front because of his alignment with the West on external politics is not entirely true. It has this element of truth in it, however, that the Prime Minister Sami Solh, who receives the odium which attaches to the President for his internal policies, has also lost most of his supporters among the Moslems because of his association with the President in Lebanon's foreign policy. This is likely to be an additional source of weakness to the régime in the weeks and months ahead. M. Sami Solh may realise that he is now coming towards the end of what will probably be his last Ministry. It is

important to him to restore his position as a Moslem leader and he is therefore likely to seek an opportunity of going out of office as a result of a break with the President on some nationalist issue—such as, for example, a claim that more Moslems should be appointed to high office in the various departments of the Government.

6. Manifestos have begun to be issued by leading political figures and parties which make it clear that, whilst they support Lebanon's present policy of collaboration with the West, they are not prepared to continue to live under a régime which is so obviously defective. This, like most of the manoeuvrings on the political front, is the first taking-up of positions by the various interested parties with a view to the struggle for the Presidency next year. That will be the hub of Lebanese politics from now onwards, despite the difficulties and even dangers of the situation from the point of view of internal law and order. I think that the present régime will be able to control all manifestations, although it is relevant that the President confided to my Oriental Counsellor that he no longer felt he could in the last resort trust the army wholeheartedly to back him up. He proposed for this reason to ask the Americans to give him arms to strengthen the gendarmerie, which is commanded by a loyal supporter of his, a definition which now does not fully apply to General Chehab, who is himself being increasingly spoken of as a candidate to succeed to the Presidency.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Baghdad and Ankara and to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

G. H. MIDDLETON.

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VL 10325/7

No. 14

## KING SAUD'S VISIT TO LEBANON

*Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received October 28)*(No. 164. Confidential) *Beirut,*  
Sir, *October 23, 1957.*

I have the honour to report that His Majesty King Saud paid an official visit to Lebanon from the 10th to the 14th October, 1957. He then moved from the Lebanese Government's official guest house to the mountain resort of Aley, where he remained for a further six days in a private capacity. The King's retinue was, as usual, immense; he was accompanied by three of his political advisers, Sheikhs Yusef Yasin, Jamal Al-Husseini and Abdullah Al Sa'doun; five further advisers on purely internal Saudi affairs, Emir Mohamed Bin Saud al-Saud (a cousin of the King), Emir Salman Bin Abdul Aziz, Mohammed Bin Dsheither, Abdul Rahman El-Hamidi and Emir Mohammed Bin Turki; the Saudi Ambassadors in Damascus, Amman, Baghdad and Beirut; five of his sons, the Emirs Khaled, Mansour, Bader, Feisal, and Abdul Illah; and the usual regiment of servants, secretaries and bodyguards. The party was joined on its arrival by the King's uncle, the Emir Ahmed, who is resident in Lebanon. The ostensible reason for His Majesty's visit was the opening of the Pan-Arab Games at the new sports stadium on the 12th of October; no secret was made, however, of the political talks which he held with President Chamoun throughout his stay, and which were the subject of the more than usually vacuous joint communiqué published at his departure and enclosed as an annex<sup>(1)</sup> to this despatch.

2. His Majesty arrived at Khaldé airport on the morning of the 10th of October, was greeted by President Chamoun, the Prime Minister and members of the Government (but not by Deputies, who took umbrage at not having been invited and later made a formal protest) and then borne away through streets lined with green Saudi flags and bridged with green banners bearing messages of welcome, together with several flimsily-constructed triumphal arches (one of which was later blown down on to a passing car). Several newspapers, Moslem and Christian, appeared with green headlines in

his honour. He lunched privately with the President and received that afternoon two delegates from the Syrian Government, Khalil Kallas and Fuad El-Halabi, who came to welcome him and, unofficially, to refute rumours that the King was unhappy about his recent talks in Syria. Afterwards he cancelled all other engagements for the day and retired to rest.

3. On the following morning, after Friday prayers at the Great Omari Mosque in company with the Prime Minister and the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (the only two Moslem members of the Lebanese Cabinet) King Saud, with the prior knowledge and consent of President Chamoun, received the two leading members of the Opposition, Abdullah Yafi and Saeb Salam, both Moslems and ex-Prime Ministers. I am reliably informed that they asked for his help in persuading President Chamoun to dissolve Parliament and hold new elections, to arrange for the Ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs to be given to members of their Opposition group, and to include a clause refuting the Eisenhower Doctrine in the joint communiqué when it appeared. In reply the King is reported to have told them in forcible terms that it was in the general Arab interest that Lebanese domestic differences should be kept within bounds and there should above all be no dispute between the Moslem and Christian communities: the Opposition should therefore co-operate with the present Government. He also asked them to give their support to the Lebanese-Saudi communiqué issued at the close of President Chamoun's official visit to Riad in March, a copy of which was enclosed in my Chancery's letter to Levant Department 1018/14/57 of March 29. They outwardly accepted his advice but His Majesty was subsequently heard to remark that they were "extremely unscrupulous and blind to the interests of their country." He added that he knew that they were "lying." (The meeting seems to have been equally unsatisfactory from the Opposition point of view; Salam and two of his collaborators are

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

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known to have left at once for Damascus for further talks with the Syrian authorities.) Later in the day the King received most of the Opposition leaders in a general meeting, reported in the Press, in which he reiterated, more or less, his remarks to Yafi and Salam. He also met two political refugees from Syria, Hosni El-Barazi and Firzat Al-Mamlouk, to whom, in the words of my informant, he "appeared sympathetic."

4. Throughout King Saud's stay in Lebanon speculation continued as to whether or not there would after all be a meeting in Beirut, before his departure, of the Heads of Arab States. His Majesty had always emphasised that he would attend no such meeting at which Egypt and Syria were not represented; accordingly a message was sent to President Nasser on the 17th of October with the suggestion that he might come on the 20th or 21st of October for talks; if not, would he mind their being held without him? The answer was received on the following day that Nasser always welcomed a meeting of this kind, but suggested that it be held at a later date so that the necessary arrangements might be made beforehand. This polite refusal made the presence of Kuwatly unlikely, particularly after King Saud's despatch of a message to Damascus on the 17th of October to the effect that he was surprised and displeased at not having received prior notification of the landing of Egyptian forces in Syria. For the rest, King Feisal was already committed to a State visit to Persia; this left only King Hussein, who was reported at one moment to be coming. A tripartite conference with Lebanon and Jordan was, however, just what Saud wished to avoid; and the project was therefore abandoned.

5. For the rest of the visit there were the usual receptions given by the President, the Prime Minister, King Saud, the Municipality of Beirut (who presented His Majesty with a golden key of the city), the Saudi Ambassador and several others. On the whole, the official arrangements went smoothly; the Lebanese organisers had clearly made a determined effort. The King was content that, despite the rupture of diplomatic relations, the French Ambassador and I should attend the Lebanese receptions; it was decided, however, that we should not be invited to Saudi parties. In the event, invitations to King Saud's dinner were inadvertently issued to both M. Roché and myself and subsequently had to be withdrawn. Neither of us was disposed to take

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too serious a view of this, though several of our colleagues considered it to be a gross breach of diplomatic courtesy. At the receptions themselves which, much to King Saud's displeasure, were boycotted by members of the Lebanese Opposition on the grounds that they could not attend any function together with President Chamoun, my main impression was one of a game of musical chairs. The number of the King's entourage was such that there was a crisis on every occasion because not enough seats could be found for them, while his armed African guards with their huge scimitars and toy revolvers shouldered people roughly aside and added considerably to the general confusion. It will also be some time before I forget the sight of rows of diplomats at the President's State dinner, resplendent in their white ties, tails and decorations, sipping Pepsi-Cola through straws from the original bottles.

6. The French Ambassador and myself also attended the special race meeting on the 13th of October. I alone attended the opening of the games, M. Roché having refused to come owing to the presence of an Algerian team among the competitors. The inaugural ceremony, crowned with fireworks, was impressive; it is only to be hoped that the stubborn refusal of the 100 white "peace pigeons" to take flight had no symbolic significance. On this occasion, as on all the others, the King was received with quite spontaneous enthusiasm and applause. He is a man of great natural dignity and more than one of my colleagues remarked on the almost papal gestures with which he appeared to bestow his benediction on the crowds. This contrasted with his public speech at the State dinner which was short, completely formal and totally inaudible.

7. During his time in Beirut His Majesty also visited the Tapline terminal and MEDRECO refinery at Sidon and the Terbol Agricultural Station near Zahlé, which enjoys considerable United States support. He left Lebanon comparatively quietly on the morning of the 20th of October.

8. Although no spectacular result has emerged from this visit several solid advantages, from the West's point of view, have accrued. All the indications are that President Chamoun and King Saud have drawn much closer together as a result of the present crisis in the Middle East. The forces of moderation and anti-Communism

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have been much strengthened by the alignment of King Saud with Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Secondly, King Saud has evidently been annoyed with Nasser for the despatch of the Egyptian troops to Syria without prior notice to himself nor—as has been reliably reported—to the President and Prime Minister of Syria. This latter consideration has driven home to King Saud the reality of the army's domination of Syria and the consequent dangers to the present régime of Russian penetration into positions of power in Syria. Finally, Syria's rejection of his mediation offer (reported in my telegram No. 16 to the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations in New York) and the manner of its announcement must have confirmed the impression King Saud had already gained of a dangerous

duality among the rulers of Syria. Altogether, therefore, I would say that he has returned to Riyadh with a heightened awareness of the dangers latent in the present Syrian situation and a strengthened desire (of which he has given evidence in his willingness to talk with us about resuming relations) for friendship with the West—a policy which President Chamoun has shown to pay off in Lebanon.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch (and enclosure) to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Baghdad and Washington and to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

G. H. MIDDLETON.

VL 10345/5

No. 15

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH LEBANON

*Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 2)*

(No. 18). Confidential)  
Sir,

*Beirut,  
November 28, 1957.*

I have the honour to report that on Tuesday evening, the 26th of November, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Charles Malik, delivered an important speech to the Chamber of Deputies on Lebanese foreign policy with particular reference to relations with the United States whence he has just returned. A text of the French translation of the speech is enclosed;<sup>(1)</sup> its more important points were:

- (i) That the United States will provide Lebanon with means of obtaining the most modern defence equipment, including teleguided missiles.
- (ii) That the United States had offered unlimited economic aid to Lebanese industry and development.
- (iii) A final elucidation of certain ambiguous points in the joint Lebanese-American communiqué of the 16th of March.
- (iv) An assurance that the Lebanon and the United States would each continue to follow a policy dictated by their own separate interests.

2. On the question of military aid Dr. Malik referred to the equipment which had passed through the streets of Beirut at the Independence Day Parade a few days previously and declared that the United States would give favourable consideration to all Lebanese requests, meet them if possible and if it were unable to do this assist Lebanon in obtaining similar equipment elsewhere. It was hoped to have teleguided missiles before long. Military sufficiency was, however, no longer a sufficient guarantee of absolute security to any country. Dr. Malik had therefore discussed further possibilities of economic aid from the United States in addition to the considerable amount which had already been received. As a result, the United States Government was prepared to contribute to any new project which had been satisfactorily planned by the Lebanese authorities. No restriction had been imposed in this sphere. The present arrangement by which the two Governments split the expenses equally between them would be "revised to our advantage". Thus the economic aid which Lebanon could now expect was "in principle unlimited". Moreover, the Americans would also help the Lebanese with their exports of citrus fruits, olives and oil in the same way as they already had with the Lebanese apple crop.

3. Three questions had arisen from the Lebanese-American communiqué of the 16th of March, 1957. Although Dr. Malik had on three occasions replied to these questions satisfactorily, he was now in a position to confirm his answers by means of an exchange of letters between Mr. Dulles and himself. The questions were:

- (i) Did the communiqué commit Lebanon to give support to the United States in the event of war with any other country; was it in fact a form of mutual defence treaty? Dr. Malik's reply had been that there is no such implication.
- (ii) Would the United States come to the aid of the Lebanon only in the case of Communist aggression or in the case of Israeli aggression also? He had replied that although the principal object was to help Lebanon against Communist aggression, the undertaking would hold good for any aggression, Communist, Israeli or any other.
- (iii) Did the communiqué oblige Lebanon to associate herself with the United States in the efforts of the latter to solve problems of the Middle East? Did it foreshadow some understanding with Israel? Dr. Malik had again replied that there was no such obligation; the reference to a peaceful solution of Middle East problems should be considered only as a declaration of general intention.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

The letters between himself and Mr. Dulles which Dr. Malik then read out confirmed his earlier replies to these questions.

4. Dr. Malik stressed that there were "certain tendencies" in the United States foreign policy which were not in accordance with Arab interests, and *vice versa*. The Lebanon would, however, never permit the United States to influence the basis of its own foreign policy nor to attempt to oblige the United States to modify their own. Thus the political and economic co-operation between Lebanon and the United States in no way prejudiced Lebanon's sovereignty; on the contrary it reinforced it. Consequently, "the aid which we are receiving from the United States can be very favourably compared both in its importance and in its effectiveness with any other aid received by any other Arab State from any other country".

5. Dr. Malik concluded his speech with a few reflections of a more general nature. He referred briefly to the special position occupied by the Lebanon and pointed out that "the real problem in the Lebanon was that of establishing concord among its inhabitants". He then made a short mention of the Palestine problem and ended with the declaration that while the cold war was becoming steadily more intense in the area and would probably become even more serious in the future, "the West has never been so firmly resolved to attack with all its strength the enslavement of the Middle East".

6. The initial reaction of most responsible Lebanese to all this has been something near incredulity at the way in which Dr. Malik has managed to obtain such a degree of *carte blanche*. I therefore took the opportunity yesterday of enquiring at the American Embassy whether there were not in fact more restrictions on the American offer than were evident in the declaration. With the exception of Dr. Malik's remarks about rockets, for which there is apparently no justification, I am assured that the rest of the statement is substantially true; it is important, however, to look carefully at the qualifying phrases. Thus, when talking of United States military aid Dr. Malik says that he has been assured that the Lebanon will be given all the defensive material it needs and *which it is capable of using*. These last few words are the operative ones since in the American view it is unlikely that the Lebanese Army will be able to absorb more than it already has; it will certainly not be able to make use of the most advanced modern weapons.

7. As regards economic aid Dr. Malik's statement that this will in future be "unlimited" seems to mean simply that in future such aid is less likely to be tied to specific projects and that the Lebanese will be given greater control over the utilisation of available funds while also enjoying the concession regarding counterpart funds which has for some time been under discussion between the two Governments (the Lebanese are of course anxious to be released altogether from the obligation of providing these funds and, while the final decision of the State Department is still awaited, it seems likely that the Americans will go most of the way—if not all the way—to meet them).

8. One cannot but be struck on reading the speech by the fact that it hardly touches on any other question except that of relations with the United States. Much of what Dr. Malik has to say is in fact a kind of *apologia* for the Eisenhower Doctrine. It may be feared that in his pro-American enthusiasm Dr. Malik has gone too far; and that the somewhat extravagant prospects which he has opened will lead to subsequent disappointment and disillusion. It is, however, only fair to say that members of the moderate Opposition with whom I have spoken (notably M. Phillipe Takla, who is President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber) seem perfectly satisfied with Dr. Malik's assurances and cannot conceal a rather grudging admiration for the Phoenician skill with which the Minister has been able to extract so much from his American friends.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch with enclosures to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Baghdad, Paris and Washington, and to the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

G. H. MIDDLETON.

VL 1052/2

No. 16

VISIT OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION TO THE  
LEBANON

*Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. Middleton (Beirut)*

(No. 201. Confidential)  
Sir,

Foreign Office,  
December 10, 1957.

I received to-day the members of the Parliamentary Delegation which recently visited the Lebanon.

2. The major point which they made to me was that, although in public the Lebanese with whom they came into contact were as inflexible as ever on the question of Israel, in private there was a growing realisation that Israel was a permanent feature in the Middle East, with which the Arabs must eventually come to terms. From a Lebanese point of view, what was wanted was security and justice for the refugees. There was an increasing willingness to tackle the refugee problem, and the point had several times been made to the Delegation that it was for the United Kingdom to take the lead in this. Any reduction in U.N.W.R.A. relief funds at this moment, when the log-jam was at last showing signs of breaking, would be a tragedy.

3. I asked the Delegation their views on the internal stability of the Lebanon. They took the view that it was as secure as any régime based purely on personalities could reasonably hope to be, although they felt that the electoral prospects of President Chamoun were doubtful.

4. The Delegation were full of praise for your activities, and for those of your staff. They were impressed by the action of the Federation of British Industries in re-equipping the American University in Beirut with British tools. They told me that everyone in the Lebanon had great expectations from the establishment of the British school and hope that the work would be pushed on speedily. In the field of action for the future, Mr. Vane, the leader of the Delegation, suggested that we might give thought to the possibility of helping in the improvement of livestock in the Lebanon.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman and Tel Aviv.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

APPENDIX  
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

VL 1902/1

No. 17

LEBANON: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

*Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received March 17)*

(No. 53. Confidential) *Beirut,*  
Sir, *March 8, 1957.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith the annual report on heads of foreign missions accredited to the Lebanon.

I have, &c.

G. H. MIDDLETON.

Enclosure

Annual Report on Heads of Missions

(Passages marked with an asterisk have been reproduced from previous reports)

**Argentina**

Dr. Carlos Maria Bollini Shaw, Ambassador (May 7, 1956).

Dr. Bollini Shaw, who is a career diplomatist, has only recently been re-employed after spending ten years *en disponibilité* during the Perón régime, of which he is an outspoken critic. He has a legal background and his last post was as legal adviser to the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He claims Scottish descent and speaks excellent English. He has not previously served in the Middle East.

Both the Ambassador and his charming wife are most friendly and pleasant colleagues.

**Austria**

Dr. Kurt Farbowsky, Minister (March 7, 1956).

Was formerly Chargé d'Affaires, a post which was only last year raised to Minister rank. He is a pleasant, friendly individual and was previously in the Foreign Ministry at Vienna and before that at Brussels. He has never visited England but speaks some English. He is married to an attractive and socially active Hungarian lady.

**Belgium**

M. Fernand Seynaeve, Minister (August 13, 1952).

\*A friendly, middle-aged man of wide experience outside the Middle East, mostly consular; his interests mainly economic. A charming wife. Both speak English and I am sure like us. (Written in 1953.)

\*Has become slightly cynical after four years in the Middle East. (Written in 1956.)

**Brazil**

M. Francisco Gualberto de Oliveira, Ambassador (January 25, 1955).

\*M. Oliveira, who is the first Brazilian representative here to hold rank as Ambassador, was

previously, I understand, a senior administrative official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro. He is married to an Austrian and has one married daughter. (Written in 1956.)

He is extremely friendly but rather a bore. He speaks French and German.

**Chile**

M. Gonzalo Montt, Minister (September 19, 1956).

Has scarcely been seen in Beirut and has not yet called. He has the reputation of being an eccentric.

**China (Nationalist)**

Dr. Kiding Wang, Minister (March 4, 1955).

I have not had the pleasure of meeting Dr. Wang.

**Colombia**

Dr. Jaime Mariñan Diaz, Minister (designate).

**Cuba**

M. Florencio Guerra, Chargé d'Affaires (October 15, 1956).

Also appointed to Saudi Arabia. M. Guerra has had a long but apparently not very distinguished career in the foreign service of his country and has held posts in Japan, France and Mexico. He seems to be an amiable and talkative if not very inspiring colleague. He is married.

**Czechoslovakia**

M. Cenek Herold, Minister (June 18, 1954).

\*M. Herold is a comparatively young man, tall, fair and of good appearance. Unlike other Communist diplomats here, he appears to have a happy disposition and seems most anxious to be pleasing and friendly. I suspect him, however, of being a rather better trimmer than most. Before being appointed to a diplomatic post he made a name for himself in Prague in the catering trade. He is said to be overbearing and unpopular with his staff. (Written in 1956.)

**Egypt**

Major-General Abdel Hamid Ghaleb, Ambassador (October 26, 1954).

\*General Ghaleb, who is in his middle forties, is married and has two sons in their teens. As a cadet he was at the Royal Military College, Woolwich. He was Military Attaché both in London (1945 to 1948) and afterwards in Washington. (Written in 1956.)

Until Suez, General Ghaleb made no secret of his friendly connections with the British in the past. Events following the Turco-Iraqi Pact did not diminish his personal friendliness, but since Suez and his implication in the bomb outrages in Lebanon against British property and institutions I have had no contact with him. He is an M.B.E.

**France**

M. Louis Roché, Ambassador (January 25, 1956).  
 \*Came here from Canberra, and speaks perfect English, having spent twenty out of the last thirty years of his life in the United Kingdom. He was at Trinity College, Cambridge, for a time. Very friendly and well disposed. Married. (Written in 1956.)

My wife and I have got to know the Rochés well. They are genuinely Anglophile and good friends of ours. He is always co-operative and helpful, though intellectually not above average.

**German Federal Republic**

Dr. Herbert Nöehring, Minister (May 20, 1953).  
 \*A rather distinguished-looking man, unmarried, in the early fifties. Sword-scarred cheek and an eye and look whose inborn hardness, an instinct for the main chance and the veneer of professional diplomacy do not completely mask. Anxious to be friendly to us and bitterly recriminative against Ribbentrop. Speaks English fluently from several years in America. Also served in pre-war Baghdad. (Written in 1953.)

He is on the point of being transferred to New Zealand.

**Greece**

M. Anastase St. Antonopoulos, Ambassador (October 31, 1956).

A friendly and amiable couple, who are anxious to be on good terms with us despite the present difficulties in official relations between our two countries.

**Holy See**

Mgr. Giuseppe Beltrami, Nuncio (December 2, 1950).

\*A dignified ecclesiastic of the old school with polished, if a trifle fussy, manners. Anxious to be friendly and having, from his own account, narrowly escaped being lynched during anti-clerical riots in South America, is very sensitive to "confessional" differences among the Lebanese. Like all Catholics and Maronites in this country, he is fearful of the further growth of the Moslem element in the population. (Written in 1956.)

**Indonesia**

M. T. M. Dalimoenthe, Chargé d'Affaires, *a.i.* (June 28, 1956).

M. Dalimoenthe is small, furtive and unattractive in appearance. He is a great supporter of the Bandoeng group of countries and is to be seen at most public receptions talking with either the Russian or the Saudi-Arabian Ambassador. He speaks good Arabic, poor English and worse French; and claims to speak Chinese, Japanese and Urdu. A rather unpleasant and slightly sinister young man.

**Iran**

M. Rahmat Atabaki, Ambassador (December 21, 1956).

Previously Minister (July 5, 1954).  
 \*Was Consul-General here some ten years ago before filling diplomatic appointments in Europe. Speaks French. Professes himself a sincere friend of Britain. His wife is related to General Zahedi. Several children. (Written in 1956.)

M. Atabaki is a staunch and vocal supporter of the Baghdad Pact and most anxious to be on the friendliest terms. Both he and his wife speak good French and are very pleasant.

**Iraq**

Saiyid Jamil Abdel Wahhab, Ambassador (July 6, 1955).

\*Active and intelligent in making contacts, but not very effective in using them. Very friendly. A relative of Nuri-es-Said. Married, with seven children. (Written in 1956.)

I have found him disappointing. He is friendly but ineffectual and his nervous manner and poor English make it difficult to establish contact.

**Italy**

Signor Pio Antonio Archi, Ambassador (April 24, 1955).

Previously Minister (since November 8, 1953).  
 \*A good professional diplomatist of the "official" type, in the late forties. Was formerly Head of the Personnel Department in Rome and before that Counsellor in Cairo. Co-operative where our interests coincide. His wife, a Florentine, friendly but a heavy, peasant sort of person. (Written in 1956.)

We have found the Archis to be good friends. His health has not been good.

**Japan**

Mr. Nobutaka Matsuda, Chargé d'Affaires, *a.i.* (since January 4, 1957).

**Jordan**

M. Abdulhamid Siraj, Chargé d'Affaires, *a.i.* (since November 1, 1955).

**Liberia**

M. Henry Gemayel, Minister (May 4, 1955).  
 Formerly Chargé d'Affaires (from February 10, 1951).

\*Is a Lebanese permanently resident in the Lebanon and thus holds a sort of local honorary appointment which the Diplomatic Corps recognise only on sufferance. (Written in 1956.)

**Mexico**

M. Rodolfo Usigli, Minister (July 11, 1956).  
 M. Usigli professes a high regard for the British way of life, has visited the United Kingdom several times and speaks good English. He is evidently anxious to be co-operative.

He is not on very good terms with many of his Latin American colleagues and when in his cups can be rather a nuisance.

He is married with at least two small children.

**Netherlands**

Dr. R. H. van Gulik, Minister (June 20, 1956).

Dr. van Gulik, who is the author of several books on oriental art and literature and is married to a Chinese, is primarily an expert in Far Eastern affairs. He has recently served as Director of the African and Middle East Division in the Foreign Ministry at The Hague and is therefore familiar with the problems of this area. He seems inclined to be thoroughly friendly and co-operative.

**Poland**

M. Włodzimierz Paszkowski, Minister (December 6, 1956).

About 45 years old, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1946, and has been in Cairo since about 1951. He speaks Arabic and some English.

I have only met M. Paszkowski on strictly official occasions.

**Saudi Arabia**

Sheikh Abdul Aziz Kuheimi, Ambassador (April 23, 1956).

Previously Minister (since September 12, 1955).  
 \*A shrewd and ruthless individual, but superficially friendly. Has been a slightly moderating influence on Saudi anti-British policy. Speaks only Arabic. (Written in 1956.)

Since the Suez crisis I very much doubt whether Sheikh Abdul Aziz has been anything but fiercely anti-British.

**Soviet Union**

M. Sergei Kiktev, Ambassador (August 22, 1956).  
 Previously Minister (since February 6, 1956).

\*A small man with a sinister record. Very active in promoting Russian interests. Married. (Written in 1956.)

M. Kiktev speaks good French and until the Hungarian and Suez affairs was moderately friendly on the rare occasions when we met.

**Spain**

M. Rafael de Los Casares, Count Rábago, Ambassador (May 7, 1956).

An inveterate card player, social round-er and night club-er, he has all the social graces but is, I suspect, a shallow creature. His wife is a rather mischievous gossip.

Count Rábago seems disposed to be friendly to this Embassy. Both he and his wife speak excellent English and French.

**Switzerland**

M. Egbert de Graffenried, Minister (July 11, 1956).  
 Extremely friendly and should prove a helpful colleague and useful addition to the Diplomatic Corps in Beirut. Active in promoting Swiss trade interests. Married.

**Turkey**

M. Cevdet Dülger, Ambassador (May 18, 1955).  
 Previously Minister (December 15, 1954).

\*Speaks quite good French. Started his career nearly twenty years ago in London and afterwards went to Cairo. Is friendly and forthcoming. His former wife is now married to Aly Yehia, the well-known cotton broker of Alexandria. M. Dülger, who has custody of the child, a daughter, has not remarried. Somewhat tactless in his diplomacy and inclined to press in and out of season. (Written in 1956.)

**United States**

Mr. Donald R. Heath, Ambassador (March 9, 1955).

\*Came to Beirut from Saigon accompanied by his wife but not his children, who are grown up. He is frank, straightforward and friendly towards Britain. (Written in 1956.)

During the difficult days of the Suez crisis Mr. and Mrs. Heath went out of their way to show their sympathy and support and he has been outspoken in his criticism of Egyptian actions. We have excellent personal relations.

**Uruguay**

M. José Aiub Manzor, Chargé d'Affaires, *a.i.* (September 9, 1951).

\*As his name implies, comes of an emigrant family of Syrian origin. He is friendly, but our paths seldom cross. (Written in 1954.)

**Venezuela**

M. Bernardo Flores, Chargé d'Affaires, *a.i.*

**Yemen**

Dr. Adnan Tarcici, Chargé d'Affaires (October 13, 1955).

\*Has shown himself friendly and anxious to make friends. An unusually cultivated representative for Yemen, married to a French wife. Speaks excellent English. (Written in 1956.)

He has been much less forthcoming of late.

**Yugoslavia**

M. Milos Lalovic, Chargé d'Affaires, *a.i.* (February 26, 1954).

\*A friendly but rather inconspicuous person. Not well informed—partly no doubt because he is a bad linguist. His (second) wife is shy and shows signs of having recently left Yugoslavia by having to refer all her opinions for confirmation to her husband. Both are very well disposed to the British. (Written in 1956.)

**Accredited to the Lebanon but Resident Elsewhere****Afghanistan (Cairo)**

M. Salaheddin Khan El-Seljouki, Minister (October 9, 1956).

**Denmark (Cairo)**

M. Christian Holten Eggert, Minister (June 1, 1956).

Does not spend much time in Beirut. Both he and his wife are friendly and pleasant.

**Dominican Republic (London)**

Dr. Luis F. Thomén, Minister (designate).

**Ethiopia (Cairo)**

M. Ato Mered Mengasha, Chargé d'Affaires, *a.i.* (April 16, 1956).

**Finland (Ankara)**

M. Bruno Kivikoski, Minister (October 1, 1954).

**Norway (Cairo)**

M. Christian Prahls Reusch, Minister (October 4, 1954).

**Peru (Cairo)**

M. Julio Fernandez Davila (Minister).

**Sudan (Baghdad)**

M. Jamal M. Ahmed, Ambassador (January 18, 1957).

Educated at Gordon College and at Exeter and Oxford. Seems genuinely friendly and well disposed towards us.

**Sweden (Cairo)**

M. C. Brynolf J. Eng, Minister (December 15, 1955).

## APPENDIX

## BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

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No. 18

## LEADING PERSONALITIES IN THE LEBANON

*Mr. Middleton to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 20)*

(No. 83. Confidential) *Beirut,*  
 Sir, *May 15, 1957.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith  
 the annual report on Leading Personalities  
 in the Lebanon.

I have, &c.

G. H. MIDDLETON.

Enclosure

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#### 1. Ibrahim Abdel Aal

Born 1917, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and French School of Engineering, Beirut. Family of Egyptian origin. Engineer by training; civil servant by adoption. Formerly Director-General of Public Works; now Director-General of Concessionary Companies. Intelligent, hard-working and, as far as is known, honest, but without many social graces.

#### 2. Robert Abela

Born 1908, Sidon; Roman Catholic; educated Jesuit University. Married. Owner-editor of (Arab language) newspaper, *Zaman*. Manager for Beirut of Arab News Agency. Now in third year as president of Lebanese Press Syndicate. Not a strong man but co-operative and useful. A British subject (Maltese origin—dual nationality) who speaks no English but is instinctively pro-British.

#### 3. Joseph Abou-Khater

Born Zahlé about 1905; Greek Catholic; educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and studied law in France. Married. Lawyer. A leader of the anti-Skaf faction in Zahlé. Formerly Lebanese Minister in Mexico; appointed Minister at Rome, 1953. Clever and politically ambitious.

#### 4. Ibrahim Ahdab

Born Beirut 1902; Sunni Moslem; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. Former contractor and engineer. Lebanese Minister at Ankara since 1947. Honest and intelligent but indecisive. Transferred to Berne in February 1954. Sent to Ankara in February 1955 as Special Envoy mainly to prepare Lebanese President's visit to Turkey and to study on the spot development of situation arising out of Bagdad Pact. Appointed Ambassador to the Court of St. James in July 1955.

#### 5. Nazim Akkari

Born 1898, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. The best Civil Servant in the Lebanon. Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office since 1945. Temporarily Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, September 1952. Honest, shrewd and experienced. A most useful and helpful source of advice and information.

#### 6. Sheikh Najib Almuhammad

Druse. Born about 1917. Married. Of Lebanese origin, he migrated to Palestine and was in Government service there for some time. Educated at American University of Beirut and thereafter did a year at Exeter University studying the British secondary educational system. Has worked for some years in the Educational Department of the Jordan Government. Returned to Beirut from Palestine after the war of 1948-49 and has been successful in commerce. Is now managing director of Middle East Airlines and of the Middle East Air Servicing Corporation, and therefore an important figure in the building up of British interest in civil aviation in the Middle East. An able executive with a Western outlook, and pro-British (he is one of

the most active members of the Board of Governors of the projected English School), but his own interests come first. He is rumoured to have political ambitions but denies it.

#### 7. Naim Amiouni

Born 1916. Worked for some seven years with Iraq Petroleum Company, from which he gained respect for British administrative methods. A career diplomat, has served in Russia and Brazil. Assistant Director of Economic Section of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1953-55. Appointed Director at end of 1955 and promoted to rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. Excellent linguist. Able and ambitious, he is co-operative with this Embassy although his political ideas are Leftish. Wife is intelligent and attractive.

#### 8. Fouad Ammoun

Born 1899, Deir el-Kamar; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. Former judge. Formerly Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with rank of Ambassador, until November 1956, when he resigned in order to be able to stand for election to the Legislature in 1957. Well educated with a broad mind and good grasp of his profession. Friendly and helpful to this Embassy within his powers but not a strong character, and without much apparent influence on policy. Visited the United Kingdom in April 1956 as guest of the British Council.

#### 9. Hussein Aouéini

Born 1902, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Greek Catholic College, Beirut. Married. Of humble origins but while still young made a large fortune in Saudi Arabia, where he still has many contacts. He has many other business interests, including, it is said, smuggling. Formerly Deputy, 1947-51. In 1951 formed caretaker Cabinet to supervise elections which he did successfully and honestly. Still regarded as a possible "non-political" Prime Minister but somewhat discredited for his financial connexions with the family of President el-Khoury and with Saudi Arabia, whose paymaster he is well known to be. Clever but an unprincipled opportunist. Took a leading part in combating Bagdad Pact and to this end joined hands with the Communists and the Opposition, notable as prime mover of the Congress of Organisations and Parties (Moslem, Arab Nationalist and fellow-travelling).

#### 10. Carlos Arida

Maronite of Tripoli, born about 1922, son of a wealthy Christian family of North Lebanon. Some education at the Jesuit School, Beirut. Is part owner of ARLEB Corporation and recently, in partnership with his brother Alphonse, bought shares in Lebanon International Airways. An active young man who has business interests in various Arab States. Despite being a Maronite, he recently married, according to Greek Orthodox doctrines, the ex-wife of Ibrahim Surock. He is a very able business man.

#### 11. George Arida

Born about 1898, in Australia; Maronite; educated abroad, mainly in Australia, Canada and Mexico. Married. Formerly Honorary British Vice-Consul at Tripoli, having returned to his family home there and opened a textile factory which earned him great wealth during the Second World War. His wife has social ambitions (e.g., his daughter married Sheikh Khalil el-Khoury (No. 76) but a Papal annulment was obtained in January 1956) and they are anxious to cut a dash (e.g., their purchase after the war of Hitler's yacht which they sold at a heavy loss). But he himself is a mild and amiable character with little personality.

#### 12. Fernand Arsanios

Born 1898, Batroun; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. Judge. *Persona non grata* under President el-Khoury. Appointed Procureur Général of the Supreme Court in February 1953; well known for his honesty and political independence.

#### 13. Emir Megid Arslan

Born about 1908, Choucifat; Druze; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Anti-German during the war; helped resist Vichy France. Several times Minister since 1943 as Druze representative, loyal to President el-Khoury; bitter opponent of Kemal Joublatt. A cheerful, uneducated and highly venal feudal chieftain with a boyish passion for dressing-up and firearms. In the habit of smuggling cattle into Israel. Again Minister in the second Yafi Cabinet under the Chamoun régime. Accompanied President on his visit to South America in May 1954. Repeatedly represented the Druzes in Cabinets since 1943, and continuously since 1954, mostly as Minister of Defence. Again Minister of Defence in the Cabinets of Sami Solh (1954), Rachid Keramé (1955) and Abdallah Yafi (1956). Minister of Health and Agriculture in Sami Solh Government of November 1956. Having lost his wife in 1953 he remarried in February 1956.

#### 14. Ahmed el-Assad

Born 1905, Taibé, South Lebanon; Shia Moslem; primary education only. Married to the clever daughter (who never appears in public) of his uncle, from whom he has inherited the feudal paramourcy in South Lebanon. Several times Minister since 1941; President of the Chamber of Deputies from 1951 until October 1953. The election of his rival, Adel Osseiran, as President of the Chamber since then and the appointment, twice, of another rival, Kazem el-Khalil, as Minister, made him side with the Opposition. He attacked the President personally, organising meetings, &c., in which operations he was financed by Saudi money. A reconciliation between him and the President in February 1956 did not last long and he began again his intrigues and plots against President Chamoun, but one must admit that this attitude is somewhat justified by the President's constant hostile attitude towards him. He is now completely in the hands of the Opposition, keeps in constant touch with the Saudi and Egyptian representatives, who keep him well supplied with money. He is a very frequent visitor to Syria, whence he is said to come back each time with more money to spend on his supporters. Suspected of being one of the clandestine channels used by Syria to send arms into the Lebanon. He and his son, Deputy Kamal, during the Suez crisis, aligned themselves openly against us and they were both among the Deputies who asked for the severance of diplomatic relations with Britain and France. He undermines authority by all lucrative means, including the sale of parliamentary seats and smuggling on the Israel border. Recently (1957) is generally thought to be under American protection.

#### 15. Assad el-Assad

Born about 1915; married. Shia Moslem from Taibé (South Lebanon) and a member of the powerful South Lebanon family of the el-Assads (Ahmed el-Assad is his brother-in-law). Educated American University of Beirut; appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Information soon after the 1939-45 war and still holds the post. Was suspended in 1951 for corrupt practices but recovered his post through political intervention. Opportunist, and not friendly to us.

**16. Raif Bellama**

Born 1897, Beirut; Maronite; educated American University, Beirut. Married. Lecturer in bacteriology at American University, Beirut. Minister of Education, 1949. Appointed Assistant Secretary-General of the Arab League in 1953. Witty and a good speaker but a political light-weight.

**17. Rashid Beydoun**

Born about 1897, Beirut; Shia Moslem; primary education. Married. Deputy since 1943. Twice Cabinet Minister. Failed to be re-elected in 1953. A genial Moslem hack politician of no great significance. Has founded, partly with his own money, a large Shia Moslem college in Beirut.

**18. Amin Beyhum**

Born 1907, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. Elected Deputy 1951 but has since greatly disappointed his electors and has never spoken in the Chamber. Did not stand for the 1953 legislative elections.

**19. Nazih Bisri**

Sunni Moslem of Sidon. Born about 1908. Married, and a graduate of the American University of Beirut. Enjoys popularity in Sidon and was elected Deputy in 1953. Was Minister of Health and National Economy from September 1955 to March 1956, then Minister of Health and Social Affairs from March 1956 to November 1956.

**20. Jawad Boulos**

Born 1900, Tripoli; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. Deputy and Minister for Foreign Affairs under French Mandate. Now an unsuccessful and disgruntled ex-politician posing as an elder statesman, ready to resume office *pour sauver la patrie*. Engaged in writing an interminable History of the Near East (he has now reached about 3,000 a.c.) about which, as most other things, he is a crashing bore. Has, since 1955, put himself under the wing of the United States Embassy in Beirut, and is even spoken of as a possible presidential candidate.

**21. Philippe Boulos**

Born 1902, North Lebanon; Greek Orthodox. Married. Lawyer and politician. Several times Minister since 1941. A safe figure for a Greek Orthodox vacancy in any Government; in the intervals resumes his place as a judge. Vice-President of the Chamber since 1952. Failed in legislative elections of 1953. Colourless with an affable veneer.

**22. Emile Boustani**

Born 1907, Sidon; Maronite (with Protestant intervals when it suits him); educated American University of Beirut and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Married to a pleasant redhead. A self-made contractor of great wealth. Head of the C.A.T. (Contracting and Trading) Company with ramifications in the Arab countries and Persian Gulf. Deputy since 1951. Strong Pan-Arabist posing as a "candid friend" of Britain with the accent on "candid." Anxious to be President of the Republic, he makes his commercial interests serve his political ambitions and *vice versa*. His main line is to gain popularity and notoriety by consistent opposition to the powers that be. The *enfant terrible* of Lebanese politics, he should not be trusted out of eyesight or earshot but his skin is so thick that he is quite an engaging rogue. Speaks excellent English. Appointed Minister of Public Works and of Planning under the Premiership of Abdallah Yafi on March 19, 1956, but threw his weight about so much that he only lasted two months. He did, however, insist on keeping the post of Head of the independent Reconstruction

Office in which, if by unorthodox means, he succeeded in doing a good deal to repair the ravages of the earthquake of March 16, 1956.

**23. Nicolas Bustros**

Born 1896, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. A rich socialite of a rather effeminate type. Entered official life as Chief of Protocol to the President of the Republic, 1937. Resigned 1938. Re-appointed 1943; later transferred in same capacity to Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1949. Holds rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. Active in intrigues leading to fall of President el-Khoury in September 1952. A quarrelsome chatterbox but intelligent and well informed, with pleasant social manners.

**24. Fouad Chader**

Born 1910. Has spent the greater part of his career in the Customs, where he established a reputation for honesty and good administration. Has been Director of Civil Aviation since 1953. Is friendly and intelligent.

**25. Camille Nimr Chamoun**

Born 1901, Deir el-Kamar; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married to the former Zelfa Tabet, an attractive woman of mixed Irish and Lebanese extraction; his sons have been educated in England. President of the Republic since September 1952; formerly lawyer and politician. Minister of the Interior, September 1943; arrested by the French November 1943, since when strongly prejudiced against France. Lebanese Minister in London 1944-47. Minister of Finance 1947 and of the Interior 1947 to May 1948. The most consistent leader of the Opposition to President el-Khoury from 1948 to September 1952, when he was himself elected President, defeating Hamid Frangie. He proved for a long time either too weak or too idle to pursue a persistent policy on the domestic front, and was a disappointment to the Opposition and the despair of the old political bosses whom he refused to consult, relying largely on his personal popularity and his talent for intrigue. In matters of foreign policy, his British connections and superficial Anglicisms helped win him the reputation of being a British tool, though in fact his policy, while wholeheartedly supporting us in any conflict with Communism, was basically Lebanese and pro-Arab. In the events of November 1956 he took a surprisingly and encouragingly strong line, refusing to allow Lebanon to be stampeded into a break with the West and adhesion to the extremist and Russophile course of Syria and Egypt, while upholding the basic claims of the Arabs and the authority of the United Nations. He proved strong enough at this time to dismiss a pro-Egyptian Government and bring in a strong and neutral one. His attractive personality makes excellent first impressions. Speaks excellent English.

**26. Joseph Nimr Chamoun**

Born 1896, Deir el-Kamar; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères and American University of Beirut. Married. Brother of President Camille Chamoun. Director-General of Public Works 1944-48. Director-General of Inspection Department since June 1952, for which rôle he is utterly unsuited. An industrious subordinate. While carrying on with his job at the Inspection Department was also appointed acting Chief of the Telephone Department in 1954.

**27. R. P. Charles de Chamussy**

Born about 1903; Père Recteur (Head) of St. Joseph's University (Jesuits). While a convinced French Jesuit, he has charming manners and is always friendly to this embassy.

**28. Joseph Charbel**

Born 1896, Zahle; Maronite; educated Collège de la Sagesse, Bachelior. Procureur Général 1943-52. Now President of the Conseil d'Etat. Victim of an attack by a member of the P.P.S., as a result of which he lay in hospital for several months. Honest and well educated but without much moral courage.

**29. Emir Abdel-Aziz Chehab**

Born 1908 at Baabda, Mt. Lebanon. Maronite. Great grandson of Emir Bechir Chehab II. Educated at Jesuit College. Formerly a magistrate then Moutafez of North Lebanon and later of South Lebanon. Appointed Director-General of the Interior in August 1955. Very clever, cunning and an opportunist. Helpful to us.

**30. Emir Farid Chehab**

Born 1909; Maronite; educated privately. Married. Head of Counter Espionage Department under the French Mandate. Imprisoned by Free French for contacts with Vichy 1942-43. Re-entered Police Department 1943 and became Director of Sûreté Générale 1948. A good linguist who gets on well with the British, but is not as deeply imbued with a sense of civic duty as he would have them believe. Extravagant and somewhat of a playboy but honest and conscientious. Made a C.B.E. in June 1956.

**31. General Fouad Chehab**

Born 1901, Beirut; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères Maristes, Jounieh. Married to a French wife. Trained in the French army and Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese Armed Forces since 1945. Gained great prestige for keeping the peace during "revolution" of September 1952, when he was temporarily Prime Minister. Was brought into the Government at the almost equally serious time of crisis in November 1956, but left it again in January 1957 as soon as he considered the crisis had passed. Honest and loyal and determined to preserve the political independence of the army. His personal charm is greater than his intelligence and he is the exasperation of his more politically-minded subordinates.

**32. Emir Jamil Chehab**

Born 1898, Beirut; Maronite, educated Collège des Frères Maristes, Jounieh. Married. Civil Servant who served with distinction in Finance and Customs departments and as Head of the Cour des Comptes. Was briefly Minister of Finance in 1956 but was too honest and conscientious to stand the pace for long. He then resigned first from the Government and then from the Civil Service. Although hard-working and conscientious, his obstinacy and narrow-mindedness have brought him into trouble with his superiors. But his independent judgment is valued by the I.P.C.

**33. Emir Khaled Chehab**

Born 1891, Hasbaya; Sunni Moslem; primary education. Married. Formerly Prime Minister and President of the Chamber under the French Mandate. Lebanese Minister at Amman 1948-52 when he was recalled by President Chamoun to become Prime Minister. Resumed his duties at Amman, with the rank of Ambassador in 1953. Honest and possessed of a certain peasant shrewdness, but his weakness and a certain appearance of imbecility were not calculated to inculcate respect for his Government. He is, however, well meaning and friendly.

**34. Ahmed Daouk**

Born 1899, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Prime Minister 1941-42 but lost influence through weakness and

incompetence. Appointed Lebanese Minister in Paris 1944 and promoted Ambassador in 1953. Put on the retired list in December 1955, but by virtue of a special arrangement he is still carrying on his duties as Ambassador in Paris. Often spoken of as a possible "neutral" Prime Minister.

**35. Nadim Demechkié**

Born 1915, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married to an English wife. Lebanese Foreign Service. Served London, Ottawa and Cairo, and was appointed Lebanese Minister to Switzerland in July 1955, with the addition of Minister to Czechoslovakia in August 1956. An able and likeable young man, he is inclined to advocate Arab Nationalist views and wishes to enter political life. Speaks good English.

**36. Pierre Eddé**

Born 1920, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Son of late President Emile Eddé; married 1950 a rich Lebanese of Brazil. Politician and champion of Christian rights in the Lebanon. Although active in politics ever since his childhood, his first entry into public life was his election as Deputy of Mount Lebanon in 1951. Minister of Finance under A. Yafi from August 1953 to March 1954. Left with his family for Brazil, his wife's country of origin, in September 1956, where he intended to remain for two or three years, but he returned to the Lebanon in May 1957 to consider taking part in the elections of June 1957 if the going was good for him. Shrewd and an intriguer.

**37. Raymond Eddé**

Born 1918, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Bachelor. Lawyer. Elder son of President Emile Eddé from whom he inherited leadership of the Francophile "Bloc National." Elected Deputy in July 1953. Honest and likeable.

**38. Maud Fargeallah**

Wife of George Fargeallah, a Christian notable of Beirut. *Née* Moutran, a leading Greek Catholic family of Baalbek, Lebanon. Born 1910. Not only one of the society ladies of Beirut, but also very deeply involved in politics. Vain and subject to frequent changes in her political attitudes. Pro-British on the whole with pro-American intermittence. Opened her house to the British Army during the Occupation period 1941-45. Not very intelligent, but likes to think that she is a political genius. Was a friend of President el-Khoury and his son, Khalil; is now a great friend of President Chamoun and his wife, but it must be said that even when Chamoun was in the Opposition she maintained cordial relations with him and his family.

**39. Jean Fattal**

Born 1903, Damascus; Syrian Catholic; educated in Austria. Married. Merchant and part owner of a firm of commission agents in Damascus and Beirut. Personally honest but a shrewd money-maker with his ear close to the political ground.

**40. Edmond Frangie**

Born about 1910, Maronite. Married. An upholsterer by trade and for many years President of Upholsterers' Trade Union. President of League of Syndicates (Jamiat) since 1955. Popular in trade union circles; anti-Communist and pro-West. Largely responsible for Jamiat affiliating to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Seems more honest than many of his colleagues. A quiet manner conceals considerable obstinacy.

**41. Hamid Frangé**

Born 1905, Zghorta; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Tripoli, and French School of Law, Beirut. Married. Lawyer and politician and Deputy. Since 1941 several times Minister, usually of Foreign Affairs, the last time being in the Sami Solh Cabinet of 1954 which he joined in 1955 when it was reshuffled; he resigned, however, in August 1955, accusing the President of undermining his work. Motivated presumably by the disappointment of his political hopes, he turned (in 1956) to increasingly open opposition to the President and he began to ally himself with the pro-Egyptian elements. Allowed himself to be appointed Chairman of an "Arab Rally" of prominent Arab personages whose aim was to support the cause of Colonel Nasser and the "liberated" Arab States against the West. This move recoiled on his head when the events of November 1956, and the subsequent rapid slide towards the left in Syria and Egypt, thoroughly alarmed Christian and moderate Lebanese. He has now lost most of his Christian support, and with it most of his chances of re-election to the Chamber. It will take him some time to mend his fences, but he is still sufficiently young and intelligent, and with a wide knowledge of Western European culture, to remain an important potential political force for the future.

**42. Moussa de Freige**

Born 1910, Beirut; Roman Catholic; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Has the hereditary papal title of Marquis which he likes to use. A wealthy socialite and race-horse owner, connected with the family of President el-Khoury and unpopular among Moslems. Had assumed responsibility for direction of *Le Jour* even before the death of his uncle, Michel Chiha, in December 1954. Speaks English.

**43. Maurice Gemayel**

Born 1910, Bikfaya; Maronite; educated Jesuit University and French School of Law, Beirut. Married. Lawyer. Leading Phalangist; cousin and brother-in-law of Pierre Gemayel (No. 44). Seeks to promote irrigation and electrical schemes. Relatively honest and intelligent.

**44. Pierre Gemayel**

Born about 1909, Bikfaya; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Leader of the Phalange Movement which affects extreme Christian and Lebanese nationalism in opposition to Moslem Pan-Arab ideas. One of the most vigorous reformist politicians outside the Chamber. Adopted a frank and courageous pro-Western attitude before, during and after the Suez affair and he and his party gained tremendously in Christian circles. A director of *Amal*.

**45. Colonel Jean Aziz Ghazi**

Born 1900, Beirut; Maronite; educated Egypt and French Army Schools. Married to a French wife. Although next in seniority to General Chehab in Lebanese army has little say in its affairs. A pleasant and vigorous personality, but discipline seems to irk him and he is inclined to rather loose anti-Western talk, which may reflect political ambitions and restlessness in his present job. Speaks English. In January 1954 was accused of preparing a military *coup* directed against his Commander-in-Chief and, as a result of this, was put on pension without being court-martialled.

**46. Fouad Ghosn**

Greek Orthodox of Koura; born 1912. Educated Ecole des Frères, Tripoli. A civil servant when his father, the late Nicolas Ghosn was a permanent

Deputy, both under the French mandate and after the Independence. Succeeded his father in the Chamber of Deputies. Appointed Minister of Education and of Posts and Telegraphs in the Yafi Cabinet of June 8, 1956, until November 16, 1956. Amiable but not very bright.

**47. Farid Habib**

Greek Orthodox from Kousba, Koura. Born 1908. Studied in Collège des Frères, Tripoli, and obtained degree of law from Jesuit School, Beirut, about 1934. Appointed magistrate in 1929, then Kaimakam (sub-district officer). Director of the Etat Civil from 1942; promoted Director-General December 1955. Fairly honest; friendly to us and co-operative. Well-known in Greek Orthodox clerical circles. Married.

**48. Ibrahim Haidar**

Born 1888, Bekaa; Shia Moslem; educated locally and in France. Married. Several times Deputy and Minister, but failed in 1953 legislative elections. A tiny little man whose bumptiousness and seniority in the Chamber gives his remarks more weight than they deserve, but a friend of the Hashemites and reasonably pro-British. A crafty and dishonest political intriguer who lost his last ministerial post for complicity in hashish smuggling.

**49. Selim Haidar**

Born 1912, Baalbek; Shia Moslem. Doctor of law, Paris. Judge and poet turned politician, with an attractive and lively wife. Lebanese Minister in Tehran from 1948 till October 1952, when he became Cabinet Minister. Elected Deputy in 1953. An amiable and gentle but colourless figure with intellectual leanings. Minister of Agriculture and Post and Telegraphs in the Sami Solh Cabinet of September 1954.

**50. Georges Haimari**

Born 1898, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. "Chef de Cabinet" to the President of the Republic 1920-43 and from 1945. O.B.E. 1947. Chairman of Lebanese Government Commission on Palestine Refugees since 1948. Honest until a few years ago when he began to feather his own and his family's nest. Much under the influence of his father confessors but very friendly and helpful to the British. He is rather an old woman and his relations with President Chamoun, though strained at first, are now steadily improving.

**51. Abdallah Hajj**

Born 1898, Ghobairi (near Beirut); Shia Moslem, educated American University of Beirut. Married. School-teacher in Bagdad, whence he was expelled, having been guilty of embezzlement. Then a politician. Elected Deputy in 1951 in the Opposition list where he still belongs and re-elected in 1953. Dishonest but dynamic. A rather unsavoury character with a nuisance value in politics. Proved to be very anti-Western and especially anti-British during the Suez Affair; was one of the few who insisted that diplomatic relations with Britain and France should be severed.

**52. Georges Hakim**

Born 1914, Tripoli, Greek Orthodox; educated at American University of Beirut. Married to an American wife. Professor and politician; after teaching economics at the American University of Beirut joined Lebanese Foreign Service and served at Lebanese Legation at Washington and the permanent Lebanese delegation at the United Nations. Appointed Minister of Finance and National Economy October 1952; also Foreign Minister in

February 1953. Honest and very intelligent, but stubborn and inclined to take an academic approach. Holds Left-wing economic views which he applies skilfully and with more political sense than appears at first sight. During the year 1954 underwent several surgical operations both in the Lebanon and in the United States. He recovered and although still weak resumed work as Assistant Secretary-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until he was transferred to Bonn as Minister in 1955. Was recalled temporarily at the end of that year to advise in the negotiations with the L.P.C. Returned again from Bonn in April 1956 to become Minister of National Economy. Again returned to Bonn as Minister in April 1957.

**53. Sabri Hamadé**

Born about 1903, Bekaa; Shia Moslem; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married to daughter of Ahmed al-Assad (No. 14). Deputy and former Minister. President of the Chamber of Deputies 1943-46 and 1948-51. A crude and venal politician whose local influence in the Bekaa gives him a nuisance value. A notorious hashish smuggler and one of the principal targets of the reformers.

**54. Said Hamadé**

Born about 1895, Mount Lebanon; Druze; educated American University of Beirut. Widower. Professor of applied economics, American University of Beirut. The Laski of the Lebanon (in moderation). Inspires the generally Left-wing economic views of such people as Georges Hakim and Kemal Joublatt. But a very gentle revolutionary with much charm and a good command of English.

**55. Joseph Harfouche**

Born 1914, Beirut; Maronite. Unmarried. Educated Jesuit University. Served in French Consulate-General in Cairo until 1945, when he was attached to Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Has served as Chargé d'Affaires in Brussels and as Minister to the Holy See. Appointed head of the Political Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1953. Reappointed Lebanese Minister to the Holy See in 1955, and additionally to Portugal in 1957. Strongly anti-Communist and pro-Western in political outlook. Anxious to promote closer relations between Lebanon and the Western Powers. Intelligent, friendly but slightly superficial.

**56. Chafik Hatem**

Born 1910, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University and French School of Law, Beirut. Married. Judge. Senior and leading official of the Ministry of Justice until February, 1953, when he became acting Director-General of that Ministry. An efficient subordinate who knows how to make himself useful, especially to President Chamoun, as a draftsman and expert on legal matters. Although fairly honest, he is a time-server and intriguer.

**57. Charles Helou**

Born 1912, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Lawyer and politician. Associated with *Le Jour*. Lebanese Minister to the Holy See 1947-49; Minister for Foreign Affairs 1951-52. Minister of Justice in the Government of Sami Solh of September 1954. An intelligent and patriotic Lebanese of the Christian persuasion with a close eye on his own advancement.

**58. Khalil Hibri**

Born 1907, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Wealthy businessman (real estate). Arab nationalist but makes no secret of his belief in co-operation with the British. Spends lavishly to ensure his popularity

among lower class Moslems of Beirut. Influential in Moslem organisations. Opposed A. Yafi in the 1953 elections but failed. Honest, loyal and generous.

**59. Joseph Hitti**

Born 1896, Shemlan; Maronite; educated American University of Beirut, followed by medical studies in the United States of America and Canada. Married. Brother of Professor Philippe Hitti, the Arab historian, of Princeton University, United States of America. Elected Deputy in 1947; stood again in 1951 but failed. Honest and a good physician without much personality or presence. His judgment in political matters is somewhat distorted by personal disappointments. But he makes himself useful as a political go-between and "fixer." Enthusiastic supporter of proposed British School.

**60. Halim Abou Izzedin**

Born 1913, Mount Lebanon; Druze; educated at American University, Beirut. Bachelor. Lebanese Foreign Service; after serving in Cairo transferred to Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1950; he became head of the Political Section in 1951 and Chief of Protocol in 1953. Acting Director-General, Ministry of Information, March 1954-March 1955. In April 1955 transferred back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Head of Protocol; later appointed Assistant Secretary-General but on being returned to his former appointment as Head of the Political Section in January 1956 he ceased coming to the office in protest. Honest, intelligent and has political ambitions. Visited United Kingdom at invitation of Her Majesty's Government August 1954. A Lebanese delegate to Afro-Asian Conference, Bandung, April 1955. Co-operative with this embassy. Speaks good English.

**61. Kemal Joublatt**

Born 1914, Mount Lebanon; Druze; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married to a lively and intelligent member of the Arslan clan. Deputy since 1943 and feudal leader of the Druze faction opposed to the Arslans. He is also leader of the Socialist and Progressive Party and the principal exponent of ideological socialism in the Lebanon, which he expounds on the platform and through his newspaper *Al Anba*. His party symbol is the crossed pick-axe and pencil. His reformist views and his personal attacks were a main motive force leading to President el-Khoury's fall in September 1952. But he has since not concealed his disappointment with the slow progress of reform under President Chamoun. He is working hard to increase his following in the Chamber after new elections but it is hard to know how much of his influence is ideological and how much depends on his position as a Druze chieftain. He is closely interested in Asiatic currents of thought, particularly in Indian mysticism but at the same time he is quite a shrewd, practical politician whose social and economic theories, if extreme, are consistent and well argued. Although opposed to communism he was until recently inclined to neglect the dangers of his Left-wing neutralism; of late is showing signs of a positive pro-West policy. A fiery demagogue in public, he has gentle and unassuming manners in private conversation. His devotion to his cause and his mystical practices are probably ruining his health, but while he lasts he is likely to remain one of the most interesting figures in the Lebanon.

**62. Mlle. Ibtihaj Kaddoura**

Born 1898, Beirut; Sunni Moslem. Leading member of various feminist organisations. Appointed municipal councillor February 1953. Honest and well meaning.



**63. Georges Karam**

Born 1897, Beirut; Maronite; educated Antoura College (Lazarists). Married. Rich timber merchant and large share-holder in Air Liban. Elected Deputy 1951 but failed in the 1953 elections. The fact that he was once imprisoned for a false Customs declaration has been conveniently forgotten and he was appointed Minister of Finance in 1953, when Sa'eb Salam was Prime Minister, and again in the Yafi Cabinet of March 19, 1956. Neither honest nor intelligent but shrewd at making money. Vain and mean but quite presentable socially.

**64. Joseph Karam**

Born 1899, Zghorta; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Tripoli. Married. The principal contender with Hamid Frangié for leadership of the Christians in North Lebanon. Deputy since 1944 but failed in the 1953 elections. Rather weak character.

**65. Rifaat Kazoun**

Born about 1908, Bekaa; Sunni Moslem; educated Lycée Français. Married. Ex-Deputy since 1943. Venal and a known arms smuggler, he is also a fanatical Moslem and was arrested in December 1952 for complicity in the murder of a Christian lawyer during municipal elections and subsequently acquitted. Is now on the Opposition side, meaning opposition to the person of the President and not to the Government in office.

**66. Raschid Keramé**

Born 1923, Tripoli; Sunni Moslem; has law degree from Cairo. Bachelor. Feudal leader who inherited political influence and prestige in Tripoli of his father, Abdel Hamid Keramé, but which he has not yet consolidated. Deputy since 1951; has served as Minister of Justice and National Economy. An ardent advocate of economic union with Syria, he has failed to achieve anything concrete. Weak, vain and moderately intelligent but honest and well meaning. Minister for National Economy and Social Affairs since August 1953. Prime Minister from September 1955 until March 1956. He showed himself obstinate and a fanatical Moslem in this office; he accomplished nothing of any value and showed strong Left-wing tendencies.

**67. Charles Kettaneh**

Born 1905, Jerusalem; Roman Catholic; educated American University of Beirut. Married to a charming and intelligent wife. Member of the important merchant firm of Kettaneh Frères. Although scrupulous in his personal dealings he is a tough and ruthless businessman. Has shrewd business sense but outside this field his judgment is fallible. Very wealthy and generous.

**68. Joseph Khadige**

Born 1900, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Formerly President of the Association of Merchants but resigned from his office when he went bankrupt. A strong and shrewd champion of Lebanon's commercial independence of her Moslem neighbours. Taciturn and straightforward. Declared bankrupt in March 1956 in spite of great efforts by President of Republic to help him out of his difficulties.

**69. Anoir Khatib**

Born 1903, Shehim; Sunni Moslem; educated School of Law, Damascus. Formerly judge, then practised as lawyer. Prominent member of the Socialist Progressive Party of Kemal Joublatt; ex-Deputy. Fairly intelligent and relatively honest.

**70. Izzet Khourchid**

Born 1902, Beirut (of family with Turkish origins); Sunni Moslem; educated Ottoman Government School, Beirut. Married. Chief of Protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1945-52, with intervals as Chief of Police. Was Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1955 until he was reappointed Chef de Protocole. Honest and civilised, he tends to be used to lend respectability to a Department which has lost face.

**71. Sheikh Béchara el-Khoury**

Born 1892, Beirut (with family origins in Mount Lebanon); Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Lawyer and politician. After bitter opposition to President Eddé and several terms as Prime Minister under French Mandate, he became the first independent President of the Lebanese Republic in 1943, and stood firmly against French pretensions in that year, being interned for his pains. Throughout his term of office he remained grateful for British support at that time. As President he showed great skill in manipulating the balance of political forces in the country and in thereby maintaining himself as the dominant factor in public life. But his inability to say "no" to his family (wife, brothers, son and remoter relatives) led to his régime becoming a synonym for corruption and nepotism. His increasingly blind self-confidence led him to resent and to try to suppress the criticism and clamour for reform and so brought him into conflict with the press and public opinion. During 1952 the opposition to him gradually gained momentum and forced him to resign in September, since when he has retired into private life, although reputed still to take a close, indirect interest in politics. In foreign affairs he had remained consistently pro-Western and anti-Communist throughout his term of office. His shortcomings as President derived mainly from weakness and inability to rise above the moral standards of those who surrounded him; but he had been a clever and successful lawyer; he conducted public business with efficiency and despatch and he is kindly and amiable in private contacts. Has now (1957) renewed his political activities and is preparing to lead a strong anti-Chamoun campaign in the elections in June 1957.

**72. Elias Khoury (Dr.)**

Born 1898, Mount Lebanon; Maronite; educated Collège de la Sagesse, Beirut. Married. Prominent in medical organisations and good works. Ex-Deputy and former Minister of Health. Honest and well meaning.

**73. Emile Khoury**

Born about 1887; Maronite; educated Collège de la Sagesse, Beirut. Bachelor. Journalist and diplomatist. Formerly foreign correspondent of Egyptian paper *El-Ahram*. Lebanese Minister at Rome 1948-53. Intelligent but dishonest. Is in the front row of the anti-Chamoun group.

**74. Sheikh Fouad el-Khoury**

Born 1894, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Wealthy merchant with a finger in almost every commercial pie. Brother of President el-Khoury whom he supported financially on the way up. During his brother's term of office greatly increased his already substantial fortune.

**75. Gabriel Khoury**

Born about 1910. Maronite, educated French schools, Beirut. Married. Employee of Banque de Syrie et du Liban since about 1935. President of Union of Bank Employees since 1946. President of Federation of United Syndicates. Supports the

Eddé "Bloc National." Anti-Communist and pro-West. Has the confidence of trade union colleagues and leads his federation intelligently. Has a reputation for financial and mental integrity.

**76. Sheikh Khalil el-Khoury**

Born 1923; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married the rich and charming former Jacqueline Arida, daughter of George Arida (No. 11). Elder son of President el-Khoury and member of his law firm. Made a large fortune by exploiting his privileged position during his father's presidency. Lay low for the first eighteen months or so of Chamoun's presidency, but is now steadily resuming his political intrigues. Separated from his wife in January 1955. (Marriage annulled January 1956.) He has since decided to lie rather low. He is well versed in the technique of corrupt political intrigue, but his methods are so tortuous that they tend to become transparent.

**77. Sheikh Sami el-Khoury**

Born 1895, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Brother of President el-Khoury. Formerly in Department of Justice. Secretary-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1944-45. Lebanese Minister at Cairo 1945-52; at Brussels and The Hague from December 1952 until July 1955, when he was appointed Ambassador to Madrid. A neat little man with no great intelligence or personality.

**78. Sheikh Selim el-Khoury**

Born 1896, Rashmaya; Maronite; educated at Jesuit University, Beirut. Bachelor. Brother of President el-Khoury, during whose presidency he exercised great influence behind the scenes and came to be known as "the Sultan." Though he never attended the Chamber he controlled eleven votes there. He thus made himself one of the main targets of the reformers. Little is heard of him now and he is presumably resting on his tarnished laurels.

**79. Victor Khoury**

Born 1903, Hadeth; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and in Mexico. Bachelor whose sister acts as hostess. Formerly lawyer. In 1944 appointed Counsellor at Lebanese Legation at London; Minister in 1947 and Ambassador in 1953. Transferred to Washington in 1955. Not a very strong character but makes good use of his amiable social manners.

**80. Salah Lababidi**

Born 1896, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Civil Servant, formerly Subdistrict Governor (Kaimakam) of Baalbek. Appointed Chief of Police of Beirut, March 1953. Arabic scholar; honest and energetic; a great friend of Abdallah Yafi, but co-operates willingly with us.

**81. Colonel Jamil Lahoud**

Born Baabdat 1905; belongs to a leading Maronite family of Mount Lebanon. "Town Major" or Area Commander since 1950. Pro-British. French education. Married.

**82. Selim Lahoud**

Born 1912. Maronite. Chief engineer of the Water Company of Beirut. Studied engineering at the Ecole des Arts et Métiers of Lille, France. Elected Deputy of Mt. Lebanon in a by-election in April 1954. Honest and hard worker. Appointed 1954 chairman of Litani Board—for hydro-electric and irrigation development of resources of Lebanon's chief river. Appointed Minister of Public Education under the Premiership of Sami Solh in July 1955

and later Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Keramé Cabinet in September 1955 and rather surprisingly held the post in successive Cabinets until the fall of the Yafi Government in November 1956. He was never a skilful Foreign Minister (he tended to be helpless between the President and the Prime Minister) and made more than one blunder. He is reported to be in financial difficulties. Married. Friendly.

**83. Subhi Mahmassani**

Born 1908, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Lycée Français, American University of Beirut and French School of Law. Married. A judge until 1947 when he resigned to stand unsuccessfully for Parliament. Now practises law; legal adviser to Point IV in the Lebanon. A clean and clever lawyer.

**84. Charles Malik**

Born 1906, North Lebanon; Greek Orthodox; educated American University of Beirut and Harvard. Married. Formerly professor of philosophy and science, American University of Beirut. As Lebanese Ambassador at Washington from 1945 to December 1955 and Permanent Representative at the United Nations, he attracted much attention by public speaking in the United States and built up for himself an influential position in Washington. His reputation in his own country also gained through his long absence from the scene. Has now returned to Beirut where he is once more on the staff of the American University. He has political ambitions and accepted office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and of Education in the strong Solh Government formed in November 1956. He immediately began to follow, largely as Head of the Lebanese Delegation at the United Nations Assembly, a foreign policy which certainly reflected the views of the President but for which the Prime Minister (Sami Solh) had frequently to devise skilful public defences.

**85. Nasri Malouf**

Born 1911, Mount Lebanon; Greek Catholic, educated Syrian School of Law of Damascus. Bachelor. Lawyer, journalist and politician. Prominent member of the National Appeal Party. Minister of Finance, National Economy and Social Affairs in Sami Solh Government of November 1956. Part-owner of *Al Jarida* newspaper; brilliant writer and orator in Arabic. Honest and proud of his independence but lazy. Susceptible to feminine influence.

**86. Abdallah Mashnouq**

Born 1899, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Journalist, formerly principal of the Moslem Makassed College of Beirut. Owns and edits *Beirut al-Massa*. Until the end of 1956, edited an excellent monthly magazine, *The Oil Family*, for the Iraq Petroleum Company, but was discharged by the company for his violent hostility to the said company. A fanatic on the subject of Islam and a strong supporter of Syro-Lebanese union. Clever and a strong personality, but venal. Has certainly been bought with Saudi money and is now strongly advocating the Saudi-Egyptian policy. Conducted a violently anti-Western campaign in his paper during and after the Suez affair. Speaks good English.

**87. Badri Meoushi**

Born 1902; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. President of the High Court since 1950. Only moderately clever but is honest and has proved independent of political influence as a judge.

**88. Jamil Mikaoui**

Born 1911, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Lycée Français, Beirut. Married to a French wife. Influential among younger Moslems and formerly leader of the Moslem nationalist Najjadet Party. Served at Lebanese Legation at London, and Minister at Bern from 1946 until 1953 when he resigned, stood for the 1953 elections and failed to be elected. He then devoted his attention to building up a lucrative legal practice and in September 1955 under R. Kerame was made Minister of Public Works and, later, acting Minister of Finance. He kept these portfolios until the Ministry fell in March 1956. Member of Board of Governors of the English School.

**89. Moussa Mobarak**

Born 1901, Antoura; Maronite; educated Lazarist College, Antoura. Married to an intelligent wife. Closely associated with the French Mandatory authorities 1923-41. Appointed "chef de Cabinet" to President el-Khoury 1943. In charge of Customs Department since 1944 except for an interlude from September 1952 to February 1953 when he was Minister for Foreign Affairs. Despite his French culture and connexions he is consistently friendly to the British and is honest and independent. He is almost unique in the Lebanon as having resigned a Ministerial portfolio on a point of principle. Although at first he succeeded in remaining on friendly terms with both the ex-President Khoury and President Chamoun, his relations with the former soon deteriorated. For the last three years has been impatiently waiting for President Chamoun to fulfil his promise to appoint him Lebanese Ambassador in Paris but this appointment has not yet taken place, partly because of the Maronite Patriarch and partly because of the reported French desire not to see this ex-employee of theirs, although staunchly pro-French, hold such a position in their capital. Intelligent and good company, but given to talking too much and thus occasionally dropping bricks.

**90. Moukhtar Moukaiech**

Born 1901, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Bachelor. Formerly lawyer. Interned for pro-German activities 1942. Served diplomatic posts including Washington, Ankara and Ottawa. Appointed Consul-General at Marseilles in 1954. Appointed Lebanese Minister to Belgium and Holland in July 1955. Fanatical Moslem. Intelligent but restless and dissatisfied with his lot.

**91. Saadi Mounla**

Born 1895, Tripoli; Sunni Moslem; educated Ottoman Government School, Tripoli. Bachelor. Landowner and politician. Deputy and former Minister. Prime Minister in 1946. Appointed Co-Guardian of the Electricity Company of Beirut in 1953 and Chairman of the Electricity Company Board in 1954. A genial old muddle-head.

**92. Kamel Mroueh**

Born 1916; Shia Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Journalist; now editor of *Hayat* and *The Daily Star*. Broadcast from Berlin in the war. Violently nationalist. A clever and unscrupulous journalist. Has sometimes been a useful ally but must be treated with caution. Speaks excellent English. An Arab union enthusiast. An outstanding supporter of the Bagdad Pact.

**93. Gabriel Murr**

Born 1895; Greek Orthodox; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Minister from 1953 to 1955. Served in United States Army in First World War. Returned to Lebanon in 1922 and became cinema proprietor. Deputy 1943-51-53. Several times Minister. Honest and well meaning.

**94. Alfred Naccache**

Born 1894, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Formerly lawyer and President of the Court of Appeal. President of the Lebanese Republic under French Mandate 1941-43 when dismissed by General Cutroux. Deputy 1943-47, re-elected Deputy in 1953. A Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1953 to 1955. Has done some political journalism. He is much under Jesuit influence but his opposition to President el-Khoury commends him to President Chamoun who often consults him. He is absolutely honest but neither a strong character nor a capable administrator. Has, in association with three others, founded a bank (Banque de Beyrouth & des Pays Arabes (S.A.L.)).

**95. Georges Naccache**

Born 1903, Alexandria; Maronite; educated Jesuit College, Alexandria. Married. Formerly civil engineer; now newspaper owner and journalist. Part-proprietor of *L'Orient* since 1924. Writes well and is clever; but gambles and is venal.

**96. Adib Nahas**

Born 1903, Tripoli; Greek Orthodox; educated Collège des Frères, Tripoli. Married. Government servant. Formerly Director-General of the Interior and Mohafez of South Lebanon. Lebanese Minister at Buenos Aires 1948-53, and now Minister at Rio de Janeiro. A first-rate official, honest, intelligent, capable and pro-British. O.B.E. 1947. Promoted to rank of Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro in March 1955.

**97. General Souleiman Naufal**

Born 1900, Merjayoun; Greek Catholic; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Served in the Lebanese Army under the French Mandate. Appointed head of the Gendarmerie 1941 and dismissed after collaborating with the French in November 1943. Formerly Director-General, Ministry of National Economy, and then Minister of National Economy 1947-48. Now controls the Capitole Cinema and does some journalism. Honest and capable, he believes strongly in maintaining the Christian position in the Lebanon if necessary by authoritarian methods.

**98. Muhieddin Nsouli**

Born 1900, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. Journalist. Owns and edits newspaper *Beirut*. Former Deputy. Minister of Information under Sa'eb Salam from April until August 1953. Interned as Axis sympathiser 1941 but is now strong supporter of co-operation with the West against communism. Despite his Arab loyalties, is ready to take a moderate line on such things as Palestine and Middle East defence. Speaks English. Has visited England. Minister of Information and at different times of Finance and of Interior in Sami Solh's Government of 1954-55. Made serious efforts to reduce corruption and maladministration, especially at Finance Ministry. Health bad.

**99. Mustapha Nsouli**

Born 1916, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Wife does not go out. Civil Servant; joined Lebanese Administration in 1944 after working in his father's firm (glassware). Appointed Director-General of National Economy in February 1953. Honest and intelligent, but not a strong character. Speaks English and is in close touch with United States Embassy; but also helpful to this embassy. Accompanied Lebanese President on his visit to South America in May 1954.

**100. Adel Osseiran**

Born 1903, Sidon; Shia Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Landowner and lawyer. Rival leader to Ahmed el-Assad in South Lebanon. Elected Speaker of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies in 1953 and re-elected in 1954 and in 1955 and in 1956. Close political associate of Camille Chamoun (now President) from 1943. Strong Arab Nationalist, especially on Palestine, but friendly to the United States and Britain though only within the limitations of the above views. A strong character, blunt and uncompromising. Speaks excellent English. Although openly and violently critical of Anglo-French action in Suez, he nevertheless refused to recommend severing of diplomatic relations with the West.

**101. Henri Pharaon**

Born 1902, Beirut; Greek Catholic; educated privately and Jesuit University, Beirut. Widower. Banker, politician and race-horse owner, in ascending order of interest. Ex-Deputy and several times Minister, usually of Foreign Affairs. He is related to President el-Khoury under whose régime he established himself as one of the principal "robber barons." By lavish expenditure poses as champion of Christian lower classes in Beirut. Homosexual and not above employing gangsters or bribery, he represents the worst type of Middle Eastern politician with whom we have to deal. Nevertheless, although he is off the political stage for the time being, he believes in co-operation with the West and has spoken in favour of Middle East defence, but is strongly opposing the Bagdad Pact.

**102. General Noureddine Rifai**

Born about 1895, Tripoli; Sunni Moslem; educated Ottoman Government School, Beirut. Married. Served in the Gendarmerie. Formerly Mohafez of North Lebanon. Appointed Director of Internal Security Forces June 1952 until March 1953, when he was made Inspector-General only of the Internal Security Forces, being thus deprived of some prerogatives. An impressive little man but a firm, capable administrator. Homosexual.

**103. Mme. Hélène Rihan**

Born about 1907, Beirut; Greek Orthodox. Wife of Dr. Habib Rihan of American University of Beirut. A leading advocate of women's rights. Formerly taught in a school for girls in Cairo. Appointed municipal councillor February 1953.

**104. Mohamed Sabra**

Shia Moslem, born about 1913. Lawyer, graduate of Jesuit School of Law. Professional diplomat until, in March 1956, he was recalled from the post of Ambassador to Jordan (he had previously been Minister to Iran) to hold the portfolios of Public Works and Information in the Yafi Cabinet. He was an able Minister and was the only one (apart from the inevitable Emir Majid Arslan) to be retained in the strong Solh Cabinet which followed it in November. He is not only capable but is also honest and is well liked in Shia circles and trusted by the President. Although he could not be described as pro-British, he maintained a reasonably objective attitude during the crisis of November 1956 and is friendly to deal with.

**105. Negib Sadaka**

Greek Catholic from Zahlé. Studied in Al-Charkieh School, Zahlé and obtained a degree in law from the French School at Beirut. Left for France, where he remained during the war and came back with a degree of doctor in law. Appointed to Minister for Foreign Affairs 1945. Later transferred as Director-General of Education. Retrained in

December 1955 to Foreign Ministry as Assistant Secretary-General. On the resignation of Fouad Ammoun it proved impossible to settle the rival claims for the succession, and Sadaka was finally appointed Acting Secretary-General. He fulfils the post adequately and honestly if without inspiration or real influence. Highly educated and honest. Visited United Kingdom as guest of British Council in 1955. Inclined towards socialism and progressionism. Married.

**106. Abdel Rahman Sahmarani**

Born 1903, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and the Sorbonne. Bachelor. His sister acts as his hostess. President of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce since 1949. A pompous bore, much given to lecturing Western representatives on how to conduct their policy so as to satisfy Arab aspirations, but unfortunately quite influential, particularly in a Pan-Arab direction.

**107. Mohammed Salam**

Born 1897, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Businessman. Runs the Moslem Makassad College and believes in British methods of education. Not a very inspiring personality but loyal to his British connexions. Speaks good English.

**108. Saeb Salam**

Born about 1902, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married to a charming and gentle wife. Brother of Mohammed Salam (No. 107). Politician and business man. Ex-Chairman, with a small personal holding, of Middle East Air Lines. Deputy in the 1943 and 1951 Chambers. Formerly Minister of the Interior. Prime Minister for a few days in September 1952 when he helped administer the *coup de grâce* to President el-Khoury. Again Prime Minister from April until August 1953. After resuming his close links with the British owing to his association with the B.O.A.C., he has gradually fallen more and more for President Nasser, whose policy *vis-à-vis* the British he supported to the maximum. During the Suez affair he was rabidly in favour of breaking off diplomatic relations with us and reason for his resignation (together with Abdalla Yafi's), while the conference of Heads of Arab States was in progress in November 1956, was the resistance of President Chamoun to side against Britain and France. A bit of an adventurer in politics and business but he is intelligent and forward looking and is likely to remain a prominent figure. Appointed Minister of State in the Yafi Cabinet of March 19, 1956. Conducted the negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company with a hostile spirit. Speaks excellent English. A leading supporter of the project to establish an English secondary school in Lebanon. He was not re-elected as Chairman of Middle-East Air Lines in 1956. Is a Trustee (President's nomination) of the British School.

**109. Anis Saleh**

Born 1907, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Formerly Magistrate and Director-General of Justice. He made himself too useful to President el-Khoury and did not survive his fall. Now has a very good practice as a lawyer.

**110. Joseph Salem**

Born 1897, Tyre; Greek Catholic; educated Collège Patriarcal, Beirut. Married. Influential business man (mainly banking and insurance). President of Association of Merchants since 1956. Lebanese Minister at Cairo 1944-45. Minister of

the Interior 1945-46. Without letting his relations with ex-President Khoury cool off, is now on close terms with President Chamoun and is usually well informed on what goes on behind the scenes. Although rather boorish at first sight he is usually friendly and co-operative and certainly has intelligence and independent judgment.

#### 111. Colonel Toufik Salem

Born 1904; Tyre; Greek Orthodox; educated Collège Patriarcal, Beirut. Married. Trained in the French army (as a contemporary of General Shishakli). Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces since 1945. A brusque and quick-tempered officer who tends to fret under General Chehab's calmer methods but is fundamentally good-natured and helpful.

#### 112. Fouad Sarrouf

Born 1906 in Cairo, of Lebanese origin; Greek Orthodox; educated at the American University of Beirut. Married to a pleasant wife born and brought up in Manchester. Journalist. Edited *Al-Mokattam* newspaper in Cairo, founded by his father. Wrote Roosevelt's life in Arabic. Appointed Vice-President (in charge of Public Relations) of American University of Beirut in 1952. Capable and honest.

#### 113. Fouad Sawaya

Born 1909 at Zahlé, Greek Catholic. Educated at "College Patriarcal," Beirut. After being a judge for several years was appointed Mohafez of Mount Lebanon from 1944-46. Mohafez of South Lebanon, 1947-49. Director of Communications and Transport, 1949-55. Director-General of Education, December 1955. Bachelor. Honest and a capable civil servant but conceited.

#### 114. Mohammed Shoucair

Born 1912, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated American University of Beirut. Married. Politician and journalist. Member of the tiny but vocal National Appeal Party. Was a disciple and great admirer of late Riad Solh. Clever and honest by Lebanese standards but loyal to his friends. Violent supporter of a pro-Iraqi policy in Syria and is more deadly opposed to present ruling teams in Damascus, including Kouwaly and Assali, who were, until recently, his great friends. Is anti-Nasser and pro-Chamoun, therefore a friend of ours who willingly co-operates when he has a chance. Visited England 1952.

#### 115. Sami Shoucair

Born 1923, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; married; educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and studied electrical engineering in the United States. Bachelor. Director of Civil Aviation in the Lebanon from 1950 until 1953 when he was dismissed because of his close connections with ex-President Bechara el-Khoury. Although born wealthy, would not miss an opportunity of making money. His main interests are women and money and he is unscrupulous and energetic in pursuit of these objectives. Very much in the pocket of the Americans.

#### 116. Abdel Karim Sibahi

Born 1887, Hama, Syria; Sunni Moslem; educated in Istanbul. A merchant with real estate in Germany where he spent the years of World War II when he was well-known for his pro-Nazi sympathies. Having been appointed a municipal councillor at the request of Abdallah Yafi, he was elected President of the Municipality in February 1953 and re-elected in 1955; resigned in 1956. Lacks energy and experience in administration. Involved in two administrative municipal scandals in 1951 in regard to building a slaughter-house and the aerodrome.

#### 117. Alfred Skaf

Born 1907, Zahlé; Greek Catholic; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. A powerful figure in the Bekaa but off the political stage since an unsuccessful term as Minister of Supply in 1943.

#### 118. Jean Skaf

Born 1908, Zahlé; Greek Catholic; educated at Zahlé. Bachelor. Leading member of the Phalange in the Bekaa. Ex-Deputy and former Minister. Intelligent and ambitious. Friendly.

#### 119. Joseph Skaff

Greek Catholic from Zahlé. Born about 1918. Speaks some English and French. Elected Deputy for South Lebanon in 1947 and is now Deputy for Zahlé. Popular leader of the Bekaa group of Deputies. Weak character. Although a rich land-owner, owes large sums of money to bank.

#### 120. Adel Solh

Sunni Moslem of Beirut, brother of Qazam and Takiuddin Solh and a cousin of Sami Solh. Born about 1902. Married to a Turk. Of poor education. Unlike his two brothers, he is not active and very little is known of him prior to his appointment as President of the Beirut Municipality.

#### 121. Kazem Solh

Born 1903, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Istanbul, Damascus and French School of Law, Beirut. Married. President of the National Appeal Party. Lebanese Minister at Bagdad since 1947, promoted to the rank of Ambassador in 1953. Intelligent and ambitious.

#### 122. Sami Solh

Born 1891, Sidon; Sunni Moslem; educated Istanbul Government College. Widower. Son of a Turkish official. Formerly Magistrate and President of the High Court. Prime Minister 1942-43, 1945-46 and 1952, when he resigned in protest against President el-Khoury's attempt to throw upon him the blame for corruption in public life. He retains considerable influence with the lower Moslem classes in Beirut, but although amiable and well meaning is too vain and too weak to follow any consistent line of thought of policy for very long. Again Prime Minister from September 1954 to September 1955; visited Turkey with President in April 1955 and headed Lebanese delegation to Bandoeng Conference in April 1955. Was called in to head a strong crisis Cabinet in November 1956, in which he was Prime Minister and carried the portfolios of the Interior, Justice and Information, and added that of Defence when General Chehab resigned in January 1957, and was acting Foreign Minister during M. Malik's long absence at the General Assembly of the United Nations. Had a serious illness in April 1957.

#### 123. Takiuddin Solh

Born 1910, Saïda; Sunni Moslem; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Bachelor. Cousin of late Riad Solh and nephew of Sami Solh (No. 122). Arab nationalist with political ambitions; dabbles in journalism. Failed in 1953 elections. Prominent member of National Appeal Party. Formerly Counsellor of Lebanese Legation at Cairo; later in Secretariat of Arab League. Very intelligent and relatively honest, but given to intrigues. A supporter of Abdul Nasser.

#### 124. Linda Sursock

Born 1887; belongs to the leading Greek Orthodox Sursock family of Beirut both by birth and by marriage, being the widow of Michel Sursock. The leading Society lady of Beirut. Perfect hostess; very hospitable house. Interested in charitable work.

#### 125. Georges Tabet

Born 1891, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Several times Minister. Has some influence in Maronite circles but is rather a contemptible old man out-classed by his wife.

#### 126. Jacques Tabet

Born 1887, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. A rich socialite and land-owner who keeps in the social swing but has no political significance.

#### 127. Joy Tabet

Born Beirut 1905; belongs to a leading Maronite Lebanese family. Swiss mother. Private Anglo-Saxon education. Great wealth. Leading Society figure; is the son-in-law of Mrs. Linda Sursock. Clever and good-mannered.

#### 128. Mme. Laure Tabet

Born 1896, Alexandria; Maronite; educated at Roman Catholic College for Girls, Alexandria. Wife of Georges Tabet (No. 125). Having no children, diverted her energies into feminist activities in and outside Lebanon, notably Red Cross and International Council of Women. Appointed municipal councillor, February 1953. Highly civilised and speaks good English.

#### 129. Bahige Takiuddin

Born 1908, Baaklin; Druze; educated Collège Patriarcal, Beirut. Married. Lawyer and politician. Deputy; formerly Minister of Agriculture. A loyal adherent of the Arslan faction and of President el-Khoury, whose spokesman he has often been in the Chamber.

#### 130. Khalil Takiuddin

Born 1905, Baaklin; Druze; educated Collège Patriarcal, Beirut. Married. Civil Servant, and Arabic poet. Served mainly in the Secretariat of the Chamber until appointed Lebanese Minister at Moscow and Stockholm 1946-53 when he became Minister to Mexico. Clever and socially presentable but servile and venal. Like the rest of his family, an opportunist. A leading figure in the pro-Egyptian set. Appointed Ambassador to Cairo December 1955, but President Nasser does not trust him and looks on him with contempt.

#### 131. Philippe Takla

Born 1914; Greek Catholic; educated Collège des Lazaristes, Antoura. Married to a rich Lebanese of Brazil by virtue of whose fortune he has acquired a certain independent standing. Lawyer and politician. Ex-Deputy and loyal supporter of President el-Khoury. Several times Minister for Foreign Affairs. He is intelligent and in most respects honest and has pleasant manners. He is quick on the uptake and easy to deal with on matters of business. Represented Lebanese President at ceremonies held in Uruguay on the taking of office of Uruguayan President in February 1955. Having consecutively failed to secure a portfolio under Chamoun, he has now become opposed to him and is taking part in Opposition movements.

#### 132. Philippe Tamer

Born about 1910, Greek Orthodox from North Lebanon. President of the Association of Industrialists, on whose behalf he is an indefatigable worker. Has arisen from modest origin by doubtful means. He is held in some contempt in commercial circles and his economic views are purely selfish and usually unsound.

#### 133. Colonel Fauzi Traboulsi

Born 1901, Deir el-Kamar; Maronite; educated Collège des Frères, Beirut. Married. Served Lebanese Gendarmerie, later in command of Internal Security Forces. Once a personal friend of President Chamoun, has not been for the last two years on speaking terms with the President, with whom he is angry for not appointing him an Ambassador somewhere. Honest and loyal but tactless, vain, pompous, excitable and of mediocre intelligence.

#### 134. Gabriel Trad

Born 1893, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. A rich socialite who enjoys parties but is also generous and prominent in charitable organisations. Honest and likeable but with no pretensions to intelligence, although he has travelled widely.

#### 135. André Tueni

Born 1910, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated Collège des Frères, Tripoli. Married. Civil Servant. Formerly Director-General of Finance, now Director-General of Public Works. Relatively honest, hard worker and capable but an unattractive creature. Unpopular with his subordinates.

#### 136. Ghassan Tueni

Born 1926, Beirut; Greek Orthodox; educated at the American University of Beirut and then studied journalism at Harvard University, United States. Journalist and politician. Prominent member of the P.P.S.; Deputy since 1951. Educated, ambitious and energetic. Relatively honest. The typical young man with great possessions but Left-wing inclinations. Speaks excellent English and visited England 1951. Ex-Deputy President, Chamber of Deputies. Married in January 1955 the daughter of Mohammed Aly Hamade, a Druze, without having to change his religion. One of the few Deputies prepared to stand up publicly for the Western connection.

#### 137. Charles Tyan

Born 1900, Beirut; Maronite; married; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Civil Servant employed in Ministry of Public Works 1943-52 where he acquired wide expert knowledge of oil and transport. Undoubtedly very corrupt but helpful to the I.P.C. Appointed Director-General of the Conseil de Planification et Développement Economique.

#### 138. Emile Tyan

Born about 1897; Maronite. Educated French School of Law; graduated as a lawyer and studied thereafter in Paris. Joined Lebanese Civil Service (Department of Justice). Resigned his post as Magistrate in about 1949 in protest against the laxity of the administration of justice under President Bechara el-Khoury. Reappointed under President Chamoun and rose to the top of the magistracy. Appointed Minister of Justice in January 1957. Honest. Of the "formation française," efficient in his job but not an important political figure.

#### 139. Abdallah Yafi

Born 1899, Beirut; Sunni Moslem; educated Jesuit University, Beirut, and in France. Married. Lawyer and politician. Several times Minister. Prime Minister 1936 and again 1951-52 and 1953-54, and in 1956, when he was in effect dismissed by President Chamoun after the Beirut meeting of Heads of Arab States, over the question of breaking off relations with Britain and France. A comparatively honest but weak and unintelligent politician, who grew increasingly restive under the Bechara el-Khoury régime, but in 1956 fell under the spell of Saeb Salam and allowed himself to be dragged into the pro-Nasser and anti-West school. He is something of a laughing stock.

**140. Maurice Zouain**

Born Mameltein (near Junieh) 1902. Belongs to a leading Maronite family of Fetouh-Kesrouan, Mt. Lebanon. On the death of his father, George Zouain (who played a leading part in the history of pre-1914 Mt. Lebanon), in 1952, resigned from his post in the Lebanese administration and entered politics. Deputy since 1953. Was Cabinet Minister (Public Education). Medium intelligence; French education. Married.

**141. Simon Zouein**

Born 1910, Beirut; Maronite; educated Jesuit University, Beirut. Married. Served all his life in Gendarmerie; now head of it with rank of colonel. Honest and loyal.

**142. Constantin Zuraik**

Born 1908, Damascus; Greek Orthodox; educated American University of Beirut and United States. Married. Professor at American University of Beirut; then president of Syrian University, Damascus, which post he relinquished in 1952 to become vice-president of the American University of Beirut (Administration). Nationalist; honest and capable.

**Religious Personalities****Maronite****1. Monseigneur Antoine Abed**

Born 1901. Archbishop of Tripoli since 1931. Closely associated with the French but friendly to this embassy. Also interested in commerce.

**2. Monseigneur Augustin Boustani**

Born 1872, Deir el-Kamar. Archbishop of South Lebanon residing at Beit-Iddin. He comes of a leading Maronite family and is intelligent and well educated but shows no friendliness to the British.

**3. Monseigneur Pierre Dib**

Born about 1885. Archbishop of Cairo but lives mainly at the Patriarch's seat at Bkerké. Learned and reputedly virtuous. A member of the commission which conducts the Patriarch's affairs and a possible successor to him.

**4. Monseigneur Elias Farah**

A Maronite, formerly Archimandrite representing the Maronite Patriarch in Alexandria (Wakil Patriarch). Born about 1907. Studied at the Jesuit School in Beirut. A good speaker in Arabic and comes from South Lebanon, Kfarbo'hum. Appointed Maronite Archbishop of Cyprus in May 1954.

**5. His Beatitude Patriarch Boulos Meouschi**

Born 1892. Jezzin. After living many years in the United States, was Archbishop of Tyr. Was Chairman of Apostolic Commission to manage the affairs of the Patriarchate during the extreme old age of Patriarch Arida. Has shown himself a vindictive and intriguing leader; trying to make himself popular with Moslem leaders. Several Christian leaders believe, however, that he is going too far in this policy, forgetting that he is a Christian religious chief and not a political leader. Opposed to Chamoun and, of course, a strong supporter of Sheikh Bechara el-Khoury, who is his relative. Indirect pressure from Rome forced him to modify this attitude in the spring of 1957. Speaks English.

**6. Monseigneur Ignace Mobarak**

Born 1876; studied at Rome. Appointed Archbishop of Beirut 1919. A vigorous champion of the civic rights of the Maronite community, but apt to become quarrelsome. He several times offered his resignation and was surprised and shocked when the Pope accepted it suddenly in 1952. Has now retired to his native village of Rashmaya, Mount Lebanon.

**7. Monseigneur Abdallah Noujaim**

Maronite, born 1904 at Baalbek. Studied for a short period in Rome. For the last few years has been partly in charge of the Maronite Community in Baalbek. During the British occupation (1941-45) always entertained very good relations with the British military authorities. Is now on the Patriarch's staff at Bkerké.

**8. Monseigneur Ignace Ziadé**

Born 1906. Archbishop of Aleppo 1945 and Beirut 1952. An educated and pleasant personality who is also a member of the commission managing the Patriarchate. In private conversation very ready to advocate the need for a strong Western policy in the Middle East.

**Greek Catholic****9. Monseigneur Philippe Nabaa**

Born about 1905; studied at Rome. Now Archbishop of Beirut. A genial and cultivated prelate who shows friendliness to this embassy and looks generally Westward.

**10. Monseigneur Maximos Sayegh**

Born 1878, Aleppo. Archbishop of Tyre 1917 and of Beirut 1933, and Patriarch since 1947. Popular among his small community. Anti-Communist and believes in the need for Western support of the Christian position in the Lebanon.

**Greek Orthodox****11. Monseigneur Elie Karam**

Born 1896. Archbishop of Mount Lebanon, living just outside Beirut. Maintains friendly relations with all foreigners but generally regarded as a Communist sympathiser and known to have close connections with the Soviet Embassy (e.g., he celebrated a mass for the repose of Stalin's soul).

**12. Monseigneur Elie Saliby**

Born 1876. Archbishop of Beirut since 1935. A smooth-tongued ecclesiastic. He is a tough element of resistance to the all too pervasive Communism in the Greek Orthodox Church. Visited Soviet Union 1956.

**Syrian Catholic****13. Cardinal Gabriel I<sup>er</sup> Tappouni**

Born 1879, Mosul. Consecrated Bishop 1913; Archbishop of Aleppo 1921; Patriarch 1929; Cardinal 1933. Worked closely with the French who supported him during the Mandate as a counterpoise to the Maronites. A strong champion of Christian rights in Lebanon and Syria. Despite his pro-French reputation makes friendly gestures to this embassy.

**Armenian Catholic****14. Cardinal Grégoire Pierre XV Agagianian**

Born 1895, Tiflis; studied at Rome. Ordained 1917; consecrated Bishop 1935; Patriarch of Armenian Catholics throughout the world 1937; appointed Cardinal 1945. A cultivated man of small stature but imposing presence. Speaks English and is in touch with English-speaking Catholics throughout the world. Despite his Russian origins, a vigorous opponent of communism, and unites in his person many opponents of East and West (political, ecclesiastical and geographical) and is therefore generally regarded, perhaps somewhat optimistically, as *papabile*.

**Armenian Orthodox****15. His Beatitude Patriarch Zarch Paylasian, Catholicos of Cilicia**

Elected in 1956 despite opposition from a delegation from Russian Armenia led by Catholicos Vasken I of Echmiadzin. A strong Tashnaq, not well supported by other factions among the Armenians. A strong character.

**16. Monseigneur Khoren Paroyan**

Born about 1905, Cyprus. Came to the Lebanon at the age of 15 and is now Archbishop of the Lebanon. He remains a British subject and still visits his parents every year in Cyprus. He is a friendly individual of no great intellectual stature. Said to have been antagonised by the Tashnaq (right-wing) tactics at the election of the Cilician Catholicos in February 1956.

**Jew****17. Benzion Lechtman**

Born about 1891 in Poland. Came to Beirut 1935 and has acted as Rabbi since 1948. Even the Jewish community regard him as colourless. Acting Grand Rabbi in Lebanon of Jewish community.

**Sunni Moslem****18. Sheik Mohammed Alaya**

Born 1883, Beirut; primary education only, but after many years in religious courts is experienced in Shia law. Twice married and twice divorced.

Appointed Mufti of the Lebanese Republic 1952 as a result of pressure on President el-Khoury by Abdallah Yafi and the Salam family. Honest but weak and unintelligent.

**Shia Moslem****19. Sayed Abdel Hussein Sharafeddin**

Born about 1867; studied at Najaf, the Shia holy place in Iraq. Now chief of the Shia community in the Lebanon. Violently anti-Christian and anti-Western but honest and much respected by his community.

**20. Sheikh Hussein el-Khatib**

Shia Moslem Qadi at present acting as head of the Shia Jafari Shari Court in Beirut.

**Druze****21. Sheikh Mohamed Abo Chakra**

Sheikh Akl of the Druze Community elected in the summer of 1948; about 55 years old; married and lives at Amatur. Sheikh Mohamed is not of a high education but a good speaker. Before his election he was the owner of a garage of transport in Damascus. He is regarded as a "foster child" of Kamal Jumblatt. He is shrewd and a practical Druze, not over his religion, but over his Druze internal political party.

**22. Sheikh Raschid Hamadeh**

Sheikh Akl of the Druze Community elected in September 1954; about 60 years old; married and an inhabitant of Baaklin. Sheikh Rashid is a *licencié en droit* from the French School of Law in Beirut. He comes from a leading Druze family. Once a magistrate in the Lebanese Court of Appeal, but dismissed on the charge of accepting a bribe; he was in fact caught red-handed by Fuad Ammoun, then his chief.

**23. Mokadem Ali Mizher**

Born 1896. Cousin of Kemal Joumblatt. Formerly a lawyer with political ambitions. He was appointed Kadi of the Druzes in Lebanon in 1945. He speaks English and professes the traditional Druze friendship for the British but is probably a rather sly intriguer.